moral absolutism
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2021 ◽  
pp. 2336825X2110647
Author(s):  
Brad Evans ◽  
Julian Reid

This essay makes a critical defence of free expression through the spirit of outrageousness. Drawing upon the ideas of Oscar Wilde, along with artists such as Frida Kahlo, Francis Bacon, Gilbert and George and Jake and Dinos Chapman, it looks beyond the current attempts to reduce the question of freedom to quintessential liberal tropes. In doing so, the paper both offers a critique of the moral absolutism that’s taken over certain sectors of the so-called ‘radical left’, while demanding more political appreciation for creatives and those with the abilities to reimagine the human subject. Such a critique not only suggests the need to rethink the meaning for freedom beyond the play of libertarians, but it also calls forth a new political subjectivity who appears timely and yet timeless – the much maligned and theoretically ignored figure of the infidel, who allows us to break free from moral entrapments.


2021 ◽  
pp. 107780122110389
Author(s):  
María L. Vecina ◽  
José C. Chacón ◽  
Raul Piñuela

The binding foundations (loyalty, authority, and purity) constitute adaptive mechanisms for preserving groups’ interests. However, they have also been related to intergroup prejudice and violence. We show that the known relationship between the binding foundations and sexist attitudes is mediated by moral absolutism, a variable that reflects the degree to which people believe that their own definition of morality is objectively correct. Two different samples are used: a conventional one (Study 1, N  =  321), and a forensic one at the beginning ( T1) and at the end ( T2) of court-mandated psychological therapy (Study 2, N  =  354; N  =  327).


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 36
Author(s):  
Iman Morshed Mohammad Hammad

This paper examines Oscar Wilde’s portrayal of characters in his famous comedy Lady Windermere’s Fan in an attempt to unravel the mystery behind the seemingly contradictory acts of behavior which are at odds with their inclinations and the attitudes they often express in their dialogues with one another. Since critics have been holding controversial views about Wilde’s craftsmanship in character delineation, the paper endeavors to prove that he meant to avoid black-and-white moral absolutism to prove that a human being is essentially unpredictable, and has a multi-facetted self which is far more sophisticated than being drawn as either good or bad. I argue that Wilde’s craftsmanship should not be under question, for his portrayal of characters is correlated to the focal point of the play which maintains that human behavior cannot be measured by a yardstick. At the beginning, I include an analysis of characters’ sayings and acts of behavior, and thereafter I briefly elucidate how Wilde utilizes them to communicate his message. The upshot of this paper contests that a human being is a potentiality that keeps unfolding. The more a person experiences life, the better he\ she tolerates difference and shows more understanding of people’s nature and motives. This seems to be the crux of Wilde’s play and the interpretation of his seemingly contradictory delineation of characters.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 833-837
Author(s):  
Nicolas Langlitz
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. 213-220
Author(s):  
Ross Carroll

This chapter concludes that the ridicule debate in Enlightenment Britain can spur political theorists to rethink their approach to these problems or, at the very least, confront complexities that their eighteenth-century forebears brought into focus. Taking the complexities of the politics of ridicule requires avoiding the extremes of Hobbesian pessimism and Shaftesburian optimism while preserving the insights of both. The ridicule debate in Enlightenment Britain can be informative beyond what it suggests about the civility or incivility of ridicule. It also secures against any easy association of ridicule with freedom. Attending to the ridicule debate should make political theorists think twice about the relationship between ridicule and democracy. An upsurge in ridicule can reflect an atmosphere of intolerant moral absolutism rather than scepticism.


Paideusis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-59
Author(s):  
Claudia W. Ruitenberg

Many student-teachers (and the students they teach) fail to understand the difference between opinions in the sense of preferences, and opinions in the sense of judgments. The phrase “That’s just your opinion!” (as wielded by contestants on the television series “American Idol”) is used to shield not only preferences but also judgments from public scrutiny. This misunderstanding springs from confusion between pluralism and relativism. Students’ fear of moral absolutism leads them to espouse relativism when they should be promoting pluralism. Within a conception of education as a social practice that mediates between the private and the public, students must learn both to justify their own judgments and to examine the judgments and justifications that others provide. This requires that students learn to distinguish “just my opinion” and “just your opinion” from morally significant judgments.


2020 ◽  
pp. 008124632095371
Author(s):  
Casper JJ van Zyl

Thinking dispositions are considered important predictors of analytic thinking. While several thinking dispositions have been found to predict responses on a range of analytic thinking tasks, this field is arguably underdeveloped. There are likely many relevant dispositional variables associated with analytic thinking that remains to be explored. This study examines one such dispositional variable, namely, attitude to ambiguity. The disposition is implied in the literature given that internal conflict – likely with associated ambiguity – is typically experienced in cognitive tasks used to study thinking and reasoning. In this article, the association between attitude to ambiguity and analytic thinking is empirically examined using Bayesian methods. A total of 313 adults (mean age = 29.31, SD = 12.19) completed the Multidimensional Attitude Toward Ambiguity (MAAS) scale, along with the Cognitive Reflection Test and a syllogism-based measure of belief bias. Results found one component of the MAAS scale, Moral Absolutism, to be a robust predictor of scores on both the Cognitive Reflection Test and the measure of belief bias.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward B. Royzman ◽  
Corey Cusimano ◽  
Stephen Metas ◽  
Robert F. Leeman

Genetically modified foods (GMFs) have met with strong opposition for most of their existence. According to one account—the consequence-based perspective (CP)—lay people oppose GMFs because they deem them unsafe as well as of dubious value. The CP is backed by the data and offers a clear solution for easing GMF opposition. However, several scholars have claimed that the CP is faulty, that lay opposition derives from largely nonrational factors and is consequence blind. One recent statement of this, the moral-absolutism perspective (MAP), contends that GMFs’ opponents are principled “moral absolutists” who think that GMFs should be banned no matter their value or risk. Herein we critically weigh key arguments for this proposal. We also present five new studies that probed the clearest data that seem to favor the MAP—opponents affirming the statement that GMFs should be “prohibited,” no matter their value or risk. These studies jointly show that (a) most presumed absolutists do not understand the key question and/or (b) cannot validly answer it. We show that taking due steps in clarifying the question and screening for those participants who cannot validly answer it cuts down absolutism to near zero. Finally, we demonstrate that helping GMFs’ opponents imagine a world wherein GMFs are safe and constructive makes the majority willing to welcome GMFs in this context.


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