Ordinal Theories and the Social Choice Analogy

We introduce and discuss the problems of intertheoretic incomparability and merely ordinal theories. We then introduce the analogy between decision-making under moral uncertainty and social choice, and explain how this analogy can help us to overcome these problems. The rest of the chapter is spent fleshing out how this idea can help us to develop a theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty that is applicable even when all theories under consideration are merely ordinal, and even when there is neither level-nor unit- comparability between those theories. We consider whether My Favourite Theory or My Favourite Option might be the right theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty in conditions of merely ordinal theories and incomparability, but reject both of these accounts. We defend the idea that, when maximizing choice worthiness is not possible, one should use the Borda Rule instead.

Maximizing Expected Choiceworthiness

In this chapter we argue that, in conditions of interval-scale measurability and unit-comparability, one should maximize expected choice worthiness. Though this position has often been suggested in the literature and is often taken to be the ‘default’ view, it has so far received little in the way of positive argument in its favour. We start, in section I, by providing new arguments against two rival theories that have been proposed in the literature—the accounts which we call My Favourite Theory and My Favourite Option. Then we give a novel argument for the view that, under moral uncertainty, one should take into account both probabilities of different theories and magnitudes of choice-worthiness. Finally, we argue in favour of maximizing expected choice-worthiness (MEC).

Metaethical Implications

In this chapter, we show that moral uncertainty creates a challenge for another metaethical view, namely non-cognitivism, according to which moral judgements are desires, or some other desire-like states, rather than beliefs. We show that it is surprisingly difficult, though perhaps not impossible, for non-cognitivists to accommodate moral uncertainty, for they lack the resources to adequately distinguish degrees of moral confidence and degrees of value ascribed to things. We discuss Lenman’s and Ridge’s versions of ecumenical expressivism and argue that neither are able to satisfactorilty explain moral uncertainty. We consider Sepielli’s defense, based on the ‘being for’ account of normative certitude, but argue that it, too, suffers from grave problems.

Practical Ethics Given Moral Uncertainty

Some philosophers have argued that moral uncertainty has striking implications for issues in practical ethics such as abortion and vegetarianism. In this chapter, we show that the prima facie implications of moral uncertainty for issues in practical ethics are far more wide-ranging than has been noted in the literature so far. We argue for this on two grounds: first, because of interaction effects between moral issues; and, second, because of the variety of different possible intertheoretic comparisons that one can reasonably endorse. Before drawing conclusions from moral uncertainty-based arguments, one first has to do the difficult job of figuring out what one’s credences in different moral viewpoints are or ought to be.

Why We Should Take Moral Uncertainty Seriously

In this chapter we introduce the topic of moral uncertainty, argue that moral uncertainty is a real and significant issue, and argue that there are non-trivial answers to the question, ‘Given that we are morally uncertain, how ought we to act in light of that uncertainty?’ In particular, we argue that there is an answer to the question of what a morally conscientious agent rationally should do when she is morally uncertain. We shall also consider and defend against some recent objections to the very project of trying to develop an account of decision-making under moral uncertainty: we’ll call these the fetishism objection; the regress objection; the blameworthiness objection; the conscientiousness objection; and the disanalogy with prudence objection.

Moral Information

In this chapter, we show how the theory we’ve given can shed light on the question of how to value gaining new moral information. We explain how we should assess the expected utility of new empirical information, and how we could use an analogous framework to work out the expected choice worthiness of new moral information. We apply this framework to two examples: the choice of how a large foundation should spend its resources, and the choice of career for an individual. Finally, we consider to what extent the lessons from this framework change when we consider ‘imperfect’ information.

Introduction

We introduce our central question: ‘Given that we are morally uncertain, how ought we to act in light of that uncertainty?’ We define key terms to help us make that question more precise, and introduce the framework within which we work. The approach we take to answering the question is ‘divide and conquer’. We ask, for each of a number of different informational situations, what the correct theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty is given that informational situation. We pay particular attention to the situations of cardinal measurability and intertheoretic comparability, cardinal measurability with no intertheoretic comparability, and merely ordinal measurability with no comparability. We then discuss what is and isn’t included within the scope of the book, and give an outline of what’s to come.

Interval-Scale Theories and Variance Voting

This chapter discusses how to take into account moral uncertainty over interval-scale measurable but non-comparable theories. Once again, we make use of the analogy between decision-making under moral uncertainty and voting. We give examples of interval-scale theories where it’s plausible to think that these theories are incomparable with each other and discuss what to do in such cases. Arguing against the Borda Rule and Ted Lockhart’s Principle of Equity Among Moral Theories, we argue in favour of an account we call variance voting. Finally, we discuss what to do in conditions where one has positive credence in some merely ordinal theories, some interval-scale but non-comparable theories, and some theories that are both interval-scale measurable and comparable with each other. We discuss whether the normalization used by this account should be done only within the decision-situation at hand, or whether it should be done over all possible decision-situations.

Fanaticism and Incomparability

In this chapter, we discuss two further problems that face accounts of decision-making under moral uncertainty, and are particularly pressing for theories that involve maximizing expected choice worthiness. First, the fanaticism problem—that the expected choice worthiness of options might be primarily determined by tiny credences in theories that posit huge amounts of value. Second, the infectious incomparability problem—that any credence in theories with radical incomparability might render the expected choice worthiness of almost every option undefined. We argue that both problems can be overcome. The fanaticism problem is a problem for decision-making under uncertainty in general, not just for decision-making in the face of moral uncertainty. The infectious incomparability problem requires an account of decision-making in the face of both moral uncertainty and incomparability. We suggest one possible account.

Intertheoretic Comparisons of Choice-Worthiness

In this chapter we consider the extent to which different theories are unit-comparable, and what makes them comparable when they are. We consider three arguments for the conclusion that intertheoretic comparisons are always impossible: the appeal to cases argument, the swamping argument, and the arbitrary unit arguments. We argue against all three arguments. We distinguish between structural and non-structural accounts of intertheoretic comparisons. We argue in favour of non-structural accounts: we argue that intertheoretic comparisons are grounded in substantive facts about the theories themselves (rather than merely statistical properties of their choice worthiness function). We discuss a number of possible accounts of intertheoretic comparisons, ultimately arguing in favour of a ‘universal scale’ account.