Model-based cognitive neuroscience: Multifield mechanistic integration in practice

Autonomist accounts of cognitive science suggest that cognitive model building and theory construction (can or should) proceed independently of findings in neuroscience. Common functionalist justifications of autonomy rely on there being relatively few constraints between neural structure and cognitive function. In contrast, an integrative mechanistic perspective stresses the mutual constraining of structure and function. In this article, I show how Model-Based Cognitive Neuroscience (MBCN) epitomizes the integrative mechanistic perspective and concentrates the most revolutionary elements of the cognitive neuroscience revolution. I also show how the prominent subset account of functional realization supports the integrative mechanistic perspective I take on MBCN and use it to clarify the intralevel and interlevel components of integration.

SUBJECTIVITY EMERGENCE IN PANPSYCHISM

A combination problem in Russelian panpsychism arises when we try to understand how macroexperience comes from microexperience. I will argue that panpsychists could avoid the combination problem if they endorse an intelligible form of emergence. They should endorse Shoemaker’s account of emergence or realization which states that there are “micro-latent” powers beside “micro-manifest” ones and accommodate this account to panpsychism. One possibility is that a macrosubject is part of a microsubject whole on Shoemaker’s “subset” account of realization. I will investigate if and how a possible solution to these panpsychist troubles could be distilled from Shoemnaker’s emergence account.