The Non-Transitivity of Causation

There are clear cases in which causation is not transitive and this drops out of the analysis developed in which causation involves a certain kind of chance-raising involved after subtracting competitor processes. Attempts to explain away these cases to secure the transitivity of causation are a mistake. Alternative ways of capturing the non-transitivity of causation involve fixing the competitor processes in order to detect chance-raising dependencies between the target cause and effect. This alternative manoeuvre engenders problems. The non-transitivity of causation is better understood in the terms of my analysis rather than by appealing to the idea that causes are difference-makers (in a specified sense) or, in the kind of cases considered, switchers by interaction with a process.

Causal Relata

This article argues that the intrinsicness of the causal relation undermines the main case for facts as the causal relata, which is based on causation by and of absences. Furthermore, it argues that since causes and effects are generally temporally and spatially related to each other, facts could not be causes and effects. It also argues that the transitivity of causation rules out at least one major candidate for causal relata, coarse-grained events. And, finally, it argues that since the best theory of causation employs the notion of qualitative or property persistence, the best candidate for causal relata must be based around tropes or particularized properties.