Causal Circumstances

The proposed analysis of causation has two immediate consequences regarding causal relata. The first is that the analysis will be satisfied by both an element in some causal circumstances for an effect and also by the causal circumstances taken in toto for that event, sometimes called the total cause of the effect. The second is that the analysis does not distinguish between elements in the causal circumstances, characterizing some as causes, others as enabling conditions, to take one alternative. These consequences are defended against those inclined to reject them or propose supplementation to the analysis. The idea of causes as contra-normal conditions either derives from certain biases at work in our attributions of causes or can be the basis for a pragmatic explanation of why we favour elements in causal circumstances as causes over others. It is a mistake to take contra-normality to be part of the nature of causation.

The Ontological Categories of Causes

A distinction is drawn between what kinds of entities may be causes and what are the fundamental causal relata. Arguments to settle the latter arise from the nature of the causal relation or more general ontological issues. Events are one fundamental causal relata because they are needed to be triggering causes. There is no need to recognize other fundamental relata than properties. Recognition of facts is neither required to capture the nature of causation nor for their truth-making role since no such role is required. Events are temporally limited particulars involving the instantiation of the properties required for the instantiation of a particular determinate property. More finely individuated events, involving the instantiation of perhaps just one property, are unnecessary. They are not needed to capture the truth of various causal claims or make the analysis of causation. Indeed, the analysis removes an argument for these other ways of understanding events.

The Ontology of E. J. Lowe’s Substance Dualism

E. J. Lowe’s model of psychophysical causation offers a way of reconciling interactive substance dualism with the causal completeness principle by denying the homogeneity of the causal relata—more specifically, by invoking a distinction between ‘fact causation’ and ‘event causation’. According to Lowe, purely physical causation is event causation, whereas psychophysical causation involves fact causation, allowing the dualist to accept a version of causal completeness which holds that all physical events have only physical causes. But Lowe’s dualist model is only as plausible as the distinction between fact and event causation upon which it rests. In this chapter it is argued that a suitable distinction between fact and event causation is difficult to maintain within most common ontological systems. It is examined whether accepting the four-category ontology that Lowe defends can alleviate the problem, but it is argued that it is not clear that it can.

Facts

The existence and nature of facts is disputed. In ordinary language we often speak of facts (‘that’s a fact’) but it is hard to take such talk seriously since it can be paraphrased away. It is better to argue for the existence of facts on the basis of three connected theoretical roles for facts. First, facts as the referents of true sentences: ‘the cat sat on the mat’, if true, refers to the fact that the cat sat on the mat. Second, facts as the truth-makers of true sentences: the fact that the cat sat on the mat is what makes ‘the cat sat on the mat’ true. Third, facts as causal relata, related in such sentences as ‘Caesar died because Brutus stabbed him’. The so-called ‘slingshot’ argument aims to show that these roles are misconceived.

Patterns, Information, and Causation

This paper articulates an account of causation as a collection of information-theoretic relationships between patterns instantiated in the causal nexus. I draw on Dennett’s account of real patterns to characterize potential causal relata as patterns with specific identification criteria and noise tolerance levels, and actual causal relata as those patterns instantiated at some spatiotemporal location in the rich causal nexus as originally developed by Salmon. I develop a representation framework using phase space to precisely characterize causal relata, including their degree(s) of counterfactual robustness, causal profiles, causal connectivity, and privileged grain size. By doing so, I show how the philosophical notion of causation can be rendered in a format that is amenable for direct application of mathematical techniques from information theory such that the resulting informational measures are causal informational measures. This account provides a metaphysics of causation that supports interventionist semantics and causal modeling and discovery techniques.

FOUR FRIENDLY CRITICS: A RESPONSE

In this reply, I seek to summarize fairly the criticisms advanced by each of my four critics, Jonathan Schaffer, Gideon Yaffe, John Gardner, and Carolina Sartorio. That there is so little overlap either in the aspects of the book on which they focus or in the arguments they advance about those issues has forced me to reply to each of them separately. Schaffer focuses much of his criticisms on my view that absences cannot serve as causal relata and argues that this commits me to the view that double preventions (such as beheadings) cannot be causal of events such as deaths. I deny that double preventions such as beheadings are not causal, while admitting that other double preventions are not causal but denying that this latter conclusion is unwelcome in its implications. Yaffe criticizes my view that a person substantially causing some harm H is sufficient for that person having performed the activity of H-ing, whereas I affirm that causing H is sufficient for doing the action of H-ing even if it is not sufficient for intentionally H-ing (Yaffe's definition of “activity”). Gardner takes issue with my “experiential argument” for the relevance of causation to moral blame; he urges that we cannot infer that we are more guilty (when we cause a harm than when we don't) from either the psychological fact that we feel more guilty or from the moral fact that it is virtuous to feel such heightened guilt, because it is viciously circular: we feel such guilt only because we have already judged that we are more guilty, and it is virtuous to feel such guilt only because we in fact are more guilty. I deny such circularity exists. Sartorio takes issue with my thesis that in omissive overdetermination cases (where each omission is sufficient to fail to prevent some harm, meaning neither is necessary) neither omitter is morally responsible for the harm. I trade intuitions with Sartorio about a range of related cases that we each think bears on the issue.

Causation

Causation is a notion that is put to work in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and even aesthetics. This bibliography addresses the main controversies surrounding this central notion itself, leaving to other entries in the relevant subfields the task of citing literature on causation relevant to the special concerns of these subdisciplines. The entry focuses on the nature of the causal relata, the objectivity of the relation, and its relation to the laws of nature, all of which have been subject to significant controversies. On the question of causal relata, the main controversy is whether it is events or facts that are related by causation, but there are alternative views as well. The ordinary assumption has been that causation is a real, objective feature of reality, but investigation of the ways in which the language of causation is context-sensitive raises questions about this assumption. In addition, a natural approach to causation is to identify it with the patterns of history that reflect the operation of laws of nature, but this regularity picture of causation has been challenged by defenders of singularity perspectives, according to which causation can occur without having any basis or connection with laws of nature. Both probabilistic and deterministic accounts will be treated, including the main alternatives in the latter camp.

Causal Relata

This article argues that the intrinsicness of the causal relation undermines the main case for facts as the causal relata, which is based on causation by and of absences. Furthermore, it argues that since causes and effects are generally temporally and spatially related to each other, facts could not be causes and effects. It also argues that the transitivity of causation rules out at least one major candidate for causal relata, coarse-grained events. And, finally, it argues that since the best theory of causation employs the notion of qualitative or property persistence, the best candidate for causal relata must be based around tropes or particularized properties.