The Legitimate Interests of the Taxpayer in the Process of Bringing Him to Liability

The article examines the legal problems of realization of legal interests of taxpayers in the framework of relations on bringing him to responsibility for committing a tax offense. It is noted the consistency and the derivation of the legitimate interests at the stage of bringing the taxpayer to tax liability with the interests of the taxpayer that occur at earlier stages of the tax interaction (interests in tax payment, the interest arising from the tax control, the interests associated with administrative appeal). The limits of implementation of measures of state coercion, the Statute of limitations for bringing to tax liability as a guarantee instrument for the protection of the legitimate interests of the taxpayer are analyzed. It is proposed to change the order of calculation of limitation periods. The author substantiates the inadmissibility of imposing additional encumbrance on the taxpayer due to the mistakes made by the tax authority. It is concluded that there is a need for a balanced approach in determining the measure of responsibility, taking into account the General legal and sectoral principles of proportionality, reasonableness and fairness.

Introducing Carbon Taxes in Russia: The Relevance of Tax-Interaction Effects

The theoretical literature on the double-dividend concept is mainly focused on pre-existing distortionary taxes in the labour and capital markets; the relevance of interactions with other taxes is often neglected. Using an analytical model and a numerical general equilibrium model, we analyse the welfare effects of carbon taxes and their interaction with other taxes applied in Russia. We find that substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes in Russia can substantially reduce the cost of carbon taxation compared to returning carbon tax revenues to households in lump-sum form and can even result in welfare gains in Russia. In conclusion, introducing carbon taxes has an indirect corrective effect with respect to the distorting effect of export taxation on energy resources. Furthermore, welfare costs of carbon taxation can be significant under the assumption of perfect international mobility of capital. Nevertheless, the cost can be more than compensated in case of a high carbon trade price.