The study examines the material scope of the shareholder´s voting prohibitions and compares sec 47 (4) GmbHG with the shareholder´s duty to abstain from voting in closed corporations in France, Great Britain, Austria and Spain. Following that, the author concentrates on the controversial prohibition of voting on resolutions concerning the performance of a legal transaction and opposes the prevailing doctrine of social acts (“Sozialaktslehre”) with her own concept for a legally certain demarcation of the legal transactions affected by a prohibition of voting on the basis of the comparative legal analysis and a systematic, historical and teleological interpretation of sec 47 (4) GmbHG. Also the practice-relevant questions of the prohibition of voting on resolutions concerning the employment contract of the managing director and shareholder as well as the dispensability of the statutory prohibition of voting are discussed. Finally, developments in Union law are considered and a proposal for a voting ban in a possible future European Private Company is made.
