Chrysippus on Determinism and Human Responsibility: A Unitary Interpretation

In this paper I aim to ascribe to Chrysippus two ‘compatibilist’ theories and to explain their differences through the fact that our sources depend on different parts of the philosopher’s corpus. This can be confirmed by a passage in Eusebius and by Chrysippus’ wordy style of writing. In my opinion, Alexander and Nemesius report the more general theory, stating that fate rules everything but employs the nature of each being as a means to accomplish its plans. Cicero and Gellius report a theory more connected with human responsibility. Their accounts are similar, but the fact that they are not drawing upon the same source becomes clear once we analyse in detail the objections to which the philosopher was responding: Cicero seems to report a criticism levelled by Arcesilaus against Zeno, Gellius one levelled against Chrysippus by his contemporaries.

Plotinus on the Conception of Time (ennoia chronou): A Re-Examination of Enn. 3.7(45).12

This paper aims to revisit a debated issue concerning the formation of the “conception of time” in Plotinus’ treatise On Eternity and Time. Over the last several years, studies have drawn attention to the fact that ennoia (“conception”) in Plotinus does not always refer to the existence of an innate notion in the soul, but that it can also refer to a conception that is formed empirically. However, it is unclear whether this holds true also for the conception of time. My claim is that, far from attributing an empirical origin to the formation of the ennoia of time, Plotinus is committed to distinguishing the ennoia of number, which measures times, from the ennoia of time in the proper sense. However, just as it is necessary to distinguish essential time from its manifestation, measured by the movements of the heavenly bodies, we must also distinguish the innate notion of essential number, which the soul naturally possesses in itself, from the notion of arithmetical number, obtained through the observation of discrete quantities. This paper thus proposes to read Enn. 3.7(45).12 in connection with the analyses developed in Enn. 6.6(34).4, which concern the ennoia of number.

Drinking and Discourse in Plato

The article argues that in the Symposium, but also the Phaedrus and the Protagoras, Plato instructs us on the correct way of engaging in discourse by adducing examples from the activities of drinking and singing (/performing poetry). By presenting Socrates as grappling with the use of wine, rhetoric and poetry, almost failing at times, but always able to recollect himself and identify the faults in his methods (as well as of others), Plato recognizes the difficulties of the process, while acknowledging Socrates’ extraordinary intellect.

An Epistemic Troika

In a characteristically stimulating and important paper, ‘Episteme’, Myles Burnyeat discusses what he calls the epistemic troika, which consists of knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge that, and knowledge how. He argues that the troika ‘lacks universal validity’; he ‘suspects’ that it is the product of Anglophone philosophy in the 1950s-early 1970s. He also challenges the philosophical value of the troika. In my paper, I explore the troika, both in its own right and as a guide to Plato’s epistemology; I also assess Burnyeat’s views on these issues.

Who Is the Demiurge, According to Plutarch? The Cosmic Soul in the iv Platonic Question

According to Plutarch, who is responsible for the ordering of the indeterminate precosmic matter? Is this activity imputable to the divine demiurgic intellect? Or are we to consider the Cosmic Soul as the force which firstly gave shape to the precosmic chora/hyle? By means of examining the iv Platonica Quaestio, I set out to maintain that, at a certain moment of his philosophical career, Plutarch thought it better to relieve the divine intellect from the task of firstly ordering the material substratum; this duty had to fall upon the Cosmic Soul. Thus, he would keep the divine intellect from any engagement in activities concerning the hyle.

L’“uno” e l’“intelletto” dell’anima umana: ricezioni neoplatoniche del Fedro di Platone

Thanks to the exegesis, Iamblichus succeeds in forging a psycho-epistemological doctrine which can boast a remarkable degree of consistency, albeit not always without minor flaws. Notably, the exegesis of Plato’s Phaedrus plays a pivotal role in constructing this system, despite moving not from phrases of the dialogue, but simply from single words, like κυβερνήτης and ἡνίοχος. Iamblichus’ anathema against Plotinus’ psychology makes Socrates’ palinode the sacred text from which to elicit those formulae of orthodoxy bound to be devoutly recited by posterior Platonists, like Hermias of Alexandria. Indeed, in this text the divine Plato has revealed the essence of the triad νοερόν, νοητόν, κριτήριον, whose each element is susceptible of being dichotomized: νοερόν in νοῦς and ἕν, νοητόν in νοητόν and ἀκρότατα νοητά, κριτήριον in καθαρμός/φιλοσοφία and ἐνθουσιασμός/θεουργία. The result of this complex and fascinating move is an outstanding proof of philology and philosophy, psychology and epistemology hermeneutics and mysticism.

The Many Voices of a Teacher without Teachers

The aim of this paper is to show that an introductory step to the Neoplatonic exegesis of the dialogue was to redefine the figure of Socrates and Socratism, so as to offer aspiring Platonists a correct interpretation of Plato and of the Neoplatonic metaphysical system. In the final stages of a long tradition, Socrates became the teacher par excellence not only of Plato but of all Platonists. In particular, by focusing on the Prolegomena to Platonic philosophy I wish to highlight the fact that, when it comes to teaching, there is no Socrates but Plato’s teacher, a teacher whose many voices – universalised according to well-defined criteria – can also be attributed to Plato. If Plato came to be seen as polyphonic and always self-consistent, this is probably because it was possible to show that Socrates’ hallmark was his ability to remain consistent while expressing many different opinions in the dialogues.

Was Democritus a Pythagorean? The Case of psychē

According to Glaucus of Rhegium Democritus was “a disciple of a Pythagorean” (dk 68 A1, 38). The tetralogical catalog of his works prepared by Thrasylus begins its section on ethics with the three following works: Pythagoras; On the Disposition of the Wise Man; On the Things in Hades (dk 68 B0a–c). The very order of the first three ethical works of Democritus could point to some sort of dependence on Pythagoreanism. This was suggested earlier by Frank (1923: 67), who believes that this is due to the fact that Democritus saw Pythagoras as basically the founder of an ethic-religious sect. Without being forced to agree with Frank, it is undeniable that there are many similarities between Pythagorean and Democritean ethics. The Democritean sentences that speak about the sense of shame before oneself as a way of preventing evil deeds (dk 68 B84, 244, and 264) recalls the practice of anamnesis, the examination of conscience in the Pythagorean tradition. Even more important are the parallel uses of measure as a basis for ethical reasoning. This paper aims to review this connection between Pythagorean traditions and Democritus, examining what emerges as the most probable core issue to determine how close this relation between atomists and Pythagoreans could have been: the Aristotelian testimony (de An. 1.2 404a16-20 [dk 58 B40]) on the material conception of the Pythagorean soul. In fact, a corpuscular conception of the soul (“dust in the air”), foreshadowing the psychology of Democritus, is attributed to the Pythagoreans. Is the argument of de An. 1.2 404a16-20 a misunderstanding by Aristotle? Or does this testimony represent an actual dialogue that Pythagoreans were having with atomists in the fifth century bce?

Plato’s Seventh Letter: Composition and Incongruences

The discussion on the authenticity of Plato’s Seventh Letter should consider its distinct parts, some incongruences between them and the editorial process of Plato’s later works. The number of times Plato has given advice and the number of travels to Sicily are differently indicated in the letter. These incongruences could be a sign of different Platonic texts being assembled by an ‘editor,’ becoming a relevant matter for the analysis of the text and its authorship.