The Battle of Thukela (Ndondakusuka), 17 April 1838

The Battle of Thukela was an important Zulu victory during the early stages of the Zulu-Boer War of 1838–1840; despite this there are few studies on this battle. This silence on the battle points to the need to fill this gap, particularly as the battle shows Zulu tactical ingenuity. In addition, this work seeks to better appreciate the role of the Zulu commander, Nongalaza kaNondela and his co-commanders, whose generalship was crucial to the Zulu victory. They used the typical Zulu order creatively showing tactical imagination and ability to improvise on the battlefield. Finally, this work also shows the role and importance of the Port Natal community in the early stages of the war and motives of their co-operation with Boers as well as the internal conflicts among the Port Natal hunter-traders.

A “New Lens” on African Military Tradition

Asking the question, “Is there a common African military tradition?” leads to consideration of the all too readily accepted tripartite periodization of African history as precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial. Does such a model sufficiently encompass African agency and actions? Or instead—being keyed to the colonial moment in the African past—might it privilege institutions of a decidedly European character? As an alternative, this essay suggests examining Africa’s military tradition around four alternatively defined analytical touchstones, each built upon exemplars of indigenous African activity. It argues that using such a “new lens” offers an opportunity to consider if there are not a variety of African military traditions, rather than an over-generalized system of supposed military values historically common to all African soldiers.

Sandfontein: An Operational Re-examination of the Battle, Contextualised within General J.C. Smuts’ First Phase of the German South West African Campaign 1914

The battle of Sandfontein November 26, 1914 marked the fledgeling Union Defence Force’s first defeat. Historians have used this long-forgotten battle as a lens to view the divisive political and military aspects of the Union’s early history. Unfortunately, some of their scholarship has passed through a distorted lens. Official histories were the first to obfuscate military and leadership shortcomings and interfere with the operational context surrounding Sandfontein. Theirs was for political reasons—a mission to protect delicate reputations and mollify a divided population. Historians have erroneously assumed that General J.C. Smuts’ initial plan for the invasion of German South West Africa 1914 was modified to exclude Walvis Bay/Swakopmund’s occupation. Instead, delays in occupying Walvis Bay/Swakopmund placed the UDF’s forces at Lüderitzbucht in a precarious position. Sandfontein, a desperate attempt to distract the Schutztruppe, was an operational failure, rather than the tactical faux pas portrayed by historians.