The Role of Ulama in Countering Boko Haram Insurgency: A Pattern of the Al-Azhar ‘Ulama

The eruption of Boko Haram and its insurgency in 2009 caused the loss of life and property that is unprecedented in northern Nigeria's history since independence. Various tools and approaches have been used in analyzing a phenomenon with a view to offering solutions to it. People from various walks of life including professionals and experts have expressed their views and opinions about groups, their activities and ways to limit them. Since the group is rightly or wrongly associated and identified with Islam in its activities, experts especially the ulama analyze the group from an Islamic perspective using the Qur'an and Sunnah and the actions of the salaf as their basis for offering solutions. to group problems. With this background, this paper examines the role of Ulama in dealing with the imbroglio of Boko Haram by using the Ulama model of Al Azhar University in particular. The historical method was adopted with data mostly collected from printed materials and the internet. This paper recommends among other things that our scholars should follow some of the approaches used by Al'azhar scholars in eliminating the influence of extremist and rebel groups. .

Chad’s northern protests point to fragile peripheries

Significance Demonstrations had started in mid-November, when the governor decided to confiscate vehicles that did not conform to regulations in an effort to crack down on criminality. However, the severity of the protests reflects deep-seated economic and security-related grievances among youth that extend beyond one administrator. Impacts Further disturbances in Faya-Largeau would cast an unwelcome shadow over the inclusive national dialogue with rebel groups. The weakness of state authority in the north will be a challenge for election administration in 2022. Unrest in Faya-Largeau and the north more broadly may embolden rebels, who attempted major assaults on Chad in 2019 and 2021.

Islamists may reap some benefits from Sudan’s coup

Significance The Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition of civilian and rebel groups have rejected the deal, but Hamdok has justified it on the grounds that (among other things) it will prevent the return of the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP), apparently responding to ongoing speculation over whether NCP-era Islamists influenced Burhan’s October 25 coup. Impacts Burhan will probably limit the work of the Empowerment Removal Committee, which aims to dismantle NCP-era power structures. Any empowerment of Islamists will likely be selective, to avoid alienating regional powers or FFC figures who might be open to cooperation. A marked turn towards Islamism would undermine the chances of a peace deal with holdout rebel groups who seek a secular state.

How rebel groups form in genocide: The Warsaw Ghetto fighters

The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising is emblematic of armed Jewish resistance to the Holocaust; it should also be emblematic of rebel organization formation and capacity building in the most extreme power asymmetry. The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising happened because civilians who were directly experiencing a genocide formed rebel organizations that gained the capacity to hold territory. Drawing from video testimonies and memoirs of survivors, diaries of witnesses, and the work of historians, this study analyzes the formation and evolution of the Jewish Fighting Organization (ŻOB) to create and begin to validate a generalizable theory on how rebel organizations form in genocide, and how they create the capacity to hold territory from the genocidal opponent. The ŻOB evolved from a violent resistance organization to a rebel organization with a military infrastructure that could hold territory against the Nazis; further, it was this capacity to hold territory that allowed the ŻOB to win the survival of many Jews. These findings offer important insights on the possibility of rebel group mobilization against genocidal persecution, and can be used to understand contemporary genocide resisters.

Cheap talk or costly commitment? Leader statements and the implementation of civil war peace agreements

This article examines how leaders affect the implementation of peace agreements. It argues that implementation is more likely when leaders have publicly committed to peace because public commitments tie leaders’ hands, making it costly to back down from peaceful promises. This effect is hypothesized to hold even under conditions that make implementation costly: when implementing difficult provisions, when spoiler risk is high, and when implementation is unreciprocated. These expectations are tested using novel data from the IPAD dataset on the implementation of peace agreements between 1989 and 2014 and on public statements by state and rebel leaders. Results show that governments and rebel groups whose leaders have publicly committed to peace are significantly more likely to make progress toward implementation. This effect holds for difficult provisions, when spoiler risk is high, and when implementation is unreciprocated. These findings highlight the importance of leaders’ political will for successful implementation of peace agreements and sustainable peace.

Oil Price Shocks and Conflict Escalation: Onshore versus Offshore

We reconsider the relationship between oil and conflict, focusing on the location of oil resources. In a panel of 132 countries over the period 1962-2009, we show that oil windfalls escalate conflict in onshore-rich countries, while they de-escalate conflict in offshore-rich countries. We use a model to illustrate how these opposite effects can be explained by a fighting capacity mechanism, whereby the government can use offshore oil income to increase its fighting capacity, while onshore oil may be looted by oppositional groups to finance a rebellion. We provide empirical evidence supporting this interpretation: we find that oil price windfalls increase both the number and strength of active rebel groups in onshore-rich countries, while they strengthen the government in offshore-rich ones.

Chad aims to co-opt rebels to reduce their threat

Significance The government’s attention is now shifting to rebels. The authorities face threats from multiple sides -- rebel groups, Boko Haram, the turmoil in the Central African Republic and the transition in Sudan -- and placating at least some rebels would help the ruling Military Transition Council (CMT) to narrow its list of concerns. Impacts Further rebel incursions would swiftly draw the attention of France, which has intervened multiple times on behalf of Chadian governments. The authorities are likely to set a date for the inclusive national dialogue soon, especially if they can secure some rebel participation. The national dialogue will symbolise confidence in the transition, but not substantive unity.

New Directions in Rebel Governance Research

Day to day governance of civilians is not solely the purview of states. Rulemaking, rule-enforcing, and goods and services provision are central components of governance, yet in many instances it is non-state actors who assume these functions. We advance the study of governance by rebel groups engaged in armed confrontation against state governments. We identify five key areas of research where the field of rebel governance is best poised to go: the study of multi-level governance, rebel use of self-constraining or hand-tying behaviors, synergy between institutional form and domestic legitimacy, the nuanced role of territorial control in governance, and short- and longer-term impacts of rebel governance on post-conflict outcomes. In each area, we draw attention to the lessons already learned, interrogate key assumptions in existing work, raise arguments that remain under- or uninvestigated, and focus on the next frontier in the exploration of rebel governance. Learning more about the ways that rebel groups govern informs our understanding of armed conflict and its resolution, as well as provides broader lessons about the study of governance.