In this paper, the concept
and recent development of exploiting frequency diverse array (FDA) and its
variants for the physical-layer wireless security have been revisited and carefully
examined. Following rigorous analytical derivation and illustrative
simulations, the authors argue that the investigations performed in some recent
works did not reveal one critical issue facing the real-world applications, and
system models established and used before were based on an unrealistic
assumption, i.e. that the legitimate and eavesdropping users at different ranges
sample the signal waveforms at the same time instant. This misunderstanding
results in conclusions that are misleading. The authors aim to take the first
step to divert research efforts and rectify the previous problematic analyses.
The authors prove that the FDA cannot secure a free-space wireless transmission
in range domain, because the previously claimed ‘secure reception region’
propagates in range domain as time elapses.
Physical-layer authentication for wireless security enhancement: current challenges and future developments
