Consumer welfare consequences of the California drought conservation mandate

Author(s):  
Steven Buck ◽  
Mehdi Nemati ◽  
David Sunding
Author(s):  
Louis Kaplow

This chapter examines the social welfare consequences of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation. From the outset, it is notable that none of the pertinent theory directly distinguishes between successful coordination due merely to recognized interdependence and that resulting from classic cartel behavior, or various cases in between. The harm from price coordination in terms of allocative inefficiency or loss in consumer welfare depends most directly on the extent and duration of supracompetitive pricing. From a dynamic perspective, price elevation may also cause production inefficiency on account of excessive entry. The expectation of above-marginal-cost prices also induces a number of other kinds of investments, many (but not all) of which are efficient.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose Maria Barrero

This paper studies how biases in managerial beliefs affect managerial decisions, firm performance, and the macroeconomy. Using a new survey of US managers I establish three facts. (1) Managers are not over-optimistic: sales growth forecasts on average do not exceed realizations. (2) Managers are overprecise (overconfident): they underestimate future sales growth volatility. (3) Managers overextrapolate: their forecasts are too optimistic after positive shocks and too pessimistic after negative shocks. To quantify the implications of these facts, I estimate a dynamic general equilibrium model in which managers of heterogeneous firms use a subjective beliefs process to make forward-looking hiring decisions. Overprecision and overextrapolation lead managers to overreact to firm-level shocks and overspend on adjustment costs, destroying 2.1 percent of the typical firm’s value. Pervasive overreaction leads to excess volatility and reallocation, lowering consumer welfare by 0.5 to 2.3 percent relative to the rational expectations equilibrium. These findings suggest overreaction may amplify asset-price and business cycle fluctuations.


Author(s):  
Peter Caradonna ◽  
Nathan Miller ◽  
Gloria Sheu
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
George S. Ford ◽  
Thomas M. Koutsky ◽  
Lawrence J. Spiwak

Author(s):  
Enrico Böhme ◽  
Jonas Severin Frank ◽  
Wolfgang Kerber

AbstractIn this paper, we show that a provision in antitrust law to allow patent settlements with a later market entry of generics than the date that is expected under patent litigation can increase consumer welfare. We introduce a policy parameter for determining the optimal additional period for collusion that would incentivize the challenging of weak patents and maximize consumer welfare. While in principle, later market entry leads to higher profits and lower consumer welfare, this can be more than compensated for if more patents are challenged as a result.


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