scholarly journals Blind justice: Fairness to groups and the do-no-harm principle

1995 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Baron
2008 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD SHAPCOTT

AbstractFor anti-cosmopolitan critics, cosmopolitanism is equated with the universalisation of a particular, liberal, account of justice and is therefore problematic for a number of reasons. The liberal principle ‘do no harm’ principle – and the cosmopolitan principle of humanitarianism, can be used to correct the depiction of cosmopolitanism as hostile to ‘pluralism’, to identify the universalism that is latent or undeveloped in much ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’, and to identify further means of reconciling these positions. A cosmopolitan harm principle argues that the absence of a universal conception of justice should not provide an obstacle to the recognition of an obligation to limit transboundary harms.


LastMile ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 52-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Odoevsky ◽  
V. Stepanets ◽  
E. Zibarev ◽  
A. Bolkunov ◽  
A. Zaichenko

Author(s):  
Abu Faisal Md. Khaled

AbstractThe article broadly examines how humanitarian aid for Rohingya refugees inadvertently harmed poorer hosts and adversely affected local capacities for peace. The article also discusses possible ways of easing tension and improving social cohesion in the refugee-hosting areas, while also highlighting how policy- and mandate-related constraints hinder a humanitarian response anchored in the "Do No Harm" principle. Finally, the article concludes with the argument that the humanitarian agencies should not just limit themselves to identifying the unintended consequences and lapses in the intervention. Instead, the Do No Harm principle should lead humanitarian aid agencies to make an active effort to accept responsibility for the harm while taking all necessary steps to mitigate or avoid harming in future interventions.


Climate Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 261-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benoit Mayer

In his essay on the thesis of my book, Alexander Zahar objects to my characterization of customary international law as one of the sources of the international law on climate change and, in particular, to my conclusion about the relevance of the no-harm principle. I disagree. In the first part of his essay, Zahar’s analysis of the no-harm principle is limited to arguments by analogy, but a valid international legal argument can be based on deduction from axiomatic premises of the international legal order. In the second part of his essay, Zahar claims that the UNFCCC regime excludes the application of the no-harm principle when, in reality, the UNFCCC regime really seeks to facilitate the implementation of general international law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 85-134
Author(s):  
Nicolas de Sadeleer

This chapter begins by explaining that the preventive principle is complementary to the polluter-pays principle by requiring the adoption of measures intended to prevent damage from arising. It then briefly reviews the evolution of the prevention principle in international law, EU law, and several national legal systems. Having determined the scope of the preventive principle in relation to other principles of environmental law (no harm principle, precautionary), the chapter systematizes its various facets (environmental standards, best available technologies, etc.). It goes on to consider the role of proportionality in determining the degree of prevention sought. It examines the sometimes ambivalent nature of the instruments typical of the preventive principle, using several case studies.


Author(s):  
McCaffrey Stephen C

This chapter focuses on the “no-harm” obligation. Article 7 of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention provides that in utilizing an international watercourse, states have an obligation to “prevent the causing of significant harm” to other states sharing the watercourse. The inclusion of this provision in the Convention, and especially its placement in a section of the Convention entitled “General Principles,” implies that it is one of the fundamental obligations in the field. Nevertheless, many questions surround the no-harm principle, particularly as it applies in the context of international watercourses. The chapter then addresses three preliminary matters. The first concerns the legal status of the no-harm principle and its relationship to equitable utilization. The second question concerns the meaning of “harm.” The third and final issue has to do with the way in which the operation of the no-harm rule has traditionally been conceived.


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