Part IV Fundamental Rights and Obligations, A Substantive Obligations, 10 The Obligation to Prevent Harm to Other Riparian States

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
McCaffrey Stephen C
Keyword(s):  
Legal Status ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Harm Principle ◽  
The Third ◽  
Significant Harm ◽  
No Harm Principle ◽  
Equitable Utilization ◽  
The Way

This chapter focuses on the “no-harm” obligation. Article 7 of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention provides that in utilizing an international watercourse, states have an obligation to “prevent the causing of significant harm” to other states sharing the watercourse. The inclusion of this provision in the Convention, and especially its placement in a section of the Convention entitled “General Principles,” implies that it is one of the fundamental obligations in the field. Nevertheless, many questions surround the no-harm principle, particularly as it applies in the context of international watercourses. The chapter then addresses three preliminary matters. The first concerns the legal status of the no-harm principle and its relationship to equitable utilization. The second question concerns the meaning of “harm.” The third and final issue has to do with the way in which the operation of the no-harm rule has traditionally been conceived.

Historical Responsibility, Harm Prohibition, and Preservation Requirement: Core Practical Convergence on Climate Change

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Shue
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Harm Principle ◽  
Ability To Pay ◽  
Historical Responsibility ◽  
Single Argument ◽  
Practical Convergence ◽  
Moral Arguments ◽  
No Harm Principle ◽  
The Way

AbstractThe purpose of this article is to map the relationships of various moral arguments for action on climate change to each other in a particular case rather than to explore any single argument in depth or to make any abstract claims about the priorities among the arguments themselves. Specifically, it tries to show that “historical responsibility”, that is, responsibility (moral or legal) for past emissions, is very important, although not quite in the way usually argued, but that it is not by itself determinative. Other, independent considerations also greatly matter, although it happens that as a matter of fact all considerations strongly tend to converge towards the same conclusions about which states are responsible to act in order to slow climate change. “Historical responsibility” is shown to involve both contribution to, or causation of, climate change and benefit from climate change. Other factors that play roles in this case are ability to pay, the no-harm principle, and the duty to preserve the physical pre-conditions of human life.

scholarly journals Future proofing the principle of no significant harm

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 731-747
Author(s):  
Joyeeta Gupta ◽  
Susanne Schmeier
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Law ◽  
Harm Principle ◽  
Agenda 2030 ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Significant Harm ◽  
Multi Level ◽  
No Harm Principle ◽  
Direct Inter ◽  
Spatial And Temporal Characteristics ◽  
Economic Capacity

Abstract The principle of ‘no significant harm’ as a way of addressing transboundary environmental challenges is both inadequately researched and inadequately implemented in many parts of the world. This paper addresses the questions: What is the nature of transboundary harm in the Anthropocene? Is the principle of no significant harm able to address current and pre-empt future transboundary harm in the field of water and environmental law? This special issue has focused on this principle in the arena of water law. This article integrates the findings in the context of a broader understanding of global harm in the Anthropocene. We draw 4 conclusions. First, conceptually harm is moving beyond direct inter-state harm between neighbouring countries to a multi-directional, multi-actor/multi-level harm, which is increasingly creeping and cumulative, with growing spatial and temporal characteristics. It thus requires moving beyond quibbling over what is ‘significant’ harm to recognize the climate emergency, the sixth biodiversity extinction, the huge damage to water systems and to realize that the threshold of ecosystem and human tolerance of damage are reducing rapidly. Second, however, the no-harm principle tends to be better developed in qualifying sovereignty in relation to transboundary harm on rivers than in the broader environmental and development arena as demonstrated by agenda 2030 which reverts to full permanent sovereignty. Third, legal scholarship, however, does provide a wide range of instruments for addressing harm before it occurs, after it has happened, and considering the differentiated economic capacity of the actors. Finally, the larger problem is that it is not individual projects or programmes that cause problems as much as national prioritization of economic growth which has led to externalizing the environment. The no-harm principle will be ineffective if it cannot be used to question the content of ‘growth’-led policies. There is need to future proof the no-harm principle.

Legality

2020 ◽  
pp. 880-899
Author(s):  
Paul Craig
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
The Third ◽  
Critical Scrutiny ◽  
Principle Of Legality ◽  
The Way

This chapter is concerned with the concept of legality, and its role in administrative law. Here, six views of the role of legality are examined. The first two views are foundational, albeit in different senses. Thus, the chapter begins with consideration as to how far legality may be conceived as foundational in the sense of being the meta-precept for administrative law doctrine. The third, fourth, and fifth views of the cathedral consider the way in which legality is deployed by way of contradistinction to other administrative law concepts, with implications for the structure of administrative law doctrine and the intensity of review. The respective distinctions are between legality and rationality, legality and the merits, and legality and policy. These dichotomies are explicated and subjected to critical scrutiny. The sixth and final role played by legality is as a distinct head of judicial review, as evidenced by the principle of legality, which exists in some common law legal systems, and is concerned with the way in which legislation that infringes fundamental rights will be interpreted. The principle is analysed, as is the rationale for the ascription of the nomenclature ‘legality’.

Determining New Selves

2019 ◽  
pp. 341-357
Author(s):  
Von Bernstorff
Keyword(s):  
Personal Development ◽  
Third World ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Western Sahara ◽  
The Third ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Third World ◽  
The Way

As one of the most significant international lawyers to emerge from the third world, Mohammed Bedjaoui is a towering figure—prolific as a scholar, active as a diplomat, and influential as a judge. Yet his intellectual and professional trajectory—and the way in which this trajectory tracked the history of post-1945 decolonization—has not been subject to sustained examination. Thus, this chapter traces Bedjaoui’s shift from an advocate of Algerian independence to a champion of self-determination in other states and territories. It examines Bedjaoui’s 1961 monograph Law and the Algerian Revolution, and then analyses the various arguments that he advanced in 1975 as a representative of Algeria in advisory proceedings relating to the international legal status of Western Sahara. It suggests that Bedjaoui’s personal development reflected a series of broader developments in regard to the commitment to political and economic self-determination that underwrote the push for decolonization.

Géographie et cartographie fictionnelles dans l’Utopie (1516) de Thomas More

Moreana ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 47 (Number 181- (3-4) ◽  
pp. 9-68
Author(s):  
Jean Du Verger
Keyword(s):  
Complex Network ◽  
Narrative Strategies ◽  
Thomas More ◽  
The Third ◽  
Editio Princeps ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
The Way

The philosophical and political aspects of Utopia have often shadowed the geographical and cartographical dimension of More’s work. Thus, I will try to shed light on this aspect of the book in order to lay emphasis on the links fostered between knowledge and space during the Renaissance. I shall try to show how More’s opusculum aureum, which is fraught with cartographical references, reifies what Germain Marc’hadour terms a “fictional archipelago” (“The Catalan World Atlas” (c. 1375) by Abraham Cresques ; Zuane Pizzigano’s portolano chart (1423); Martin Benhaim’s globe (1492); Martin Waldseemüller’s Cosmographiae Introductio (1507); Claudius Ptolemy’s Geographia (1513) ; Benedetto Bordone’s Isolario (1528) ; Diogo Ribeiro’s world map (1529) ; the Grand Insulaire et Pilotage (c.1586) by André Thevet). I will, therefore, uncover the narrative strategies used by Thomas More in a text which lies on a complex network of geographical and cartographical references. Finally, I will examine the way in which the frontispiece of the editio princeps of 1516, as well as the frontispiece of the third edition published by Froben at Basle in 1518, clearly highlight the geographical and cartographical aspect of More’s narrative.

Ragam Qiraat Al-Qur'an

SUHUF ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-72
Author(s):  
Ahmad Fathoni
Keyword(s):  
The Third ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Way

The object of the study of the knowledge of the variety of the Quranic reading  is the  Qur'an itself. The focus is on the difference of the reading and its articulation. The method is based on the riwayat or narration which is originated from the Prophet (Rasulullah saw) and its use is to be one of the instruments to keep the originality of the Qur’an. The validity of the reading the Qur’an is to be judged based on the valid chain  (sanad ¡a¥ī¥)  in accord with the Rasm U£mānÄ« as well as with the  Arabic grammar. Whereas the qualification of its originality is divided into six stages as follow: the first is mutawātir, the second is masyhÅ«r, the third is āhād, the fourth is syaz, the fifth is maudū‘, and the six is mudraj. Of this six catagories, the readings which can be included in the catagory of mutawātir are Qiraat Sab‘ah (the seven readings) and Qiraat ‘Asyrah  (the ten readings). To study this knowledge of reading the Qur’an (ilmu qiraat), one is advised to know about special terms being used such as  qiraat  (readings), riwayat (narration), tarÄ«q (the way), wajh (aspect), mÄ«m jama‘, sukÅ«n mÄ«m jama‘ and many others.

Is There a Right to Free Movement across Borders?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Song
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Free Movement ◽  
Individual Freedom ◽  
Freedom Of Association ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Freedom Of Movement ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Right ◽  
Logical Extension

Chapter 6 examines three rights-based arguments for freedom of movement across borders. Three rights-based arguments have been offered in support of freedom of international movement. The first claims that freedom of movement is a fundamental human right in itself. The second adopts a “cantilever” strategy, arguing that freedom of international movement is a logical extension of existing fundamental rights, including the right of domestic free movement and the right to exit one’s country. The third argument is libertarian: international free movement is necessary to respect individual freedom of association and contract. This chapter shows why these arguments fail to justify a general right to free movement across the globe. What is morally required is not a general right of international free movement but an approach that privileges those whose basic human rights are at stake.

Explaining the Epigraphic Habit in the Roman Empire: The Evidence of Epitaphs

1990 ◽  
Vol 80 ◽  
pp. 74-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth A. Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Roman Empire ◽  
North Africa ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Right ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
Over Time

It is now notorious that the production of inscriptions in the Roman Empire was not constant over time, but rose over the first and second centuries A.D. and fell in the third. Ramsay MacMullen pointed this out more than five years ago, with conclusions more cautionary than explanatory: ‘history is not being written in the right way’, he said, for historians have deduced Rome's decline from evidence that–since it appears only epigraphically–has merely disappeared for its own reasons, or have sought general explanations of decline in theories political, economic, or even demographic in nature, none of which can, in turn, explain the disappearance of epigraphy itself. Why this epigraphic habit rose and fell MacMullen left open to question, although he did postulate control by a ‘sense of audience’. The purpose of this paper is to propose that this ‘sense of audience’ was not generalized or generic, but depended on a belief in the value of romanization, of which (as noted but not explained by MacMullen's article) the epigraphic habit is also a rough indicator. Epitaphs constitute the bulk of all provincial inscriptions and in form and number are (generally speaking) the consequence of a provincial imitation of characteristically Roman practices, an imitation that depended on the belief that Roman legal status and style were important, and that may indeed have ultimately depended, at least in North Africa, on the acquisition or prior possession of that status. Such status-based motivations for erecting an epitaph help to explain not only the chronological distribution of epitaphs but also the differences in the type and distribution of epitaphs in the western and eastern halves of the empire. They will be used here moreover to suggest an explanation for the epigraphic habit as a whole.

How to Distinguish Aristotle's Virtues

Phronesis ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marguerite Deslauriers
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Art ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Way

AbstractThis paper considers the distinctions Aristotle draws (1) between the intellectual virtue of phronêsis and the moral virtues and (2) among the moral virtues, in light of his commitment to the reciprocity of the virtues. I argue that Aristotle takes the intellectual virtues to be numerically distinct hexeis from the moral virtues. By contrast, I argue, he treats the moral virtues as numerically one hexis, although he allows that they are many hexeis 'in being'. The paper has three parts. In the first, I set out Aristotle's account of the structure of the faculties of the soul, and determine that desire is a distinct faculty. The rationality of a desire is not then a question of whether or not the faculty that produces that desire is rational, but rather a question of whether or not the object of the desire is good. In the second section I show that the reciprocity of phronêsis and the moral virtues requires this structure of the faculties. In the third section I show that the way in which Aristotle distinguishes the faculties requires that we individuate moral virtues according to the objects of the desires that enter into a given virtue, and with reference to the circumstances in which these desires are generated. I then explore what it might mean for the moral virtues to be different in being but not in number, given the way in which the moral virtues are individuated. I argue that Aristotle takes phronêsis and the political art to be a numerical unity in a particular way, and that he suggests that the moral virtues are, by analogy, the same kind of unity.

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