Minimum Wages, On‐the‐Job Training, and Wage Growth

1999 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 539-556
Author(s):  
Adam J. Grossberg ◽  
Paul Sicilian
1999 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 539 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam J. Grossberg ◽  
Paul Sicilian

10.3386/w7184 ◽  
1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daron Acemoglu ◽  
Jorn-Steffen Pischke

2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 832-846 ◽  
Author(s):  
Burhanettin Kuruscu

This paper challenges the notion that on-the-job training investments are quantitatively important for workers' welfare and argues that on-the-job training may not increase lifetime income by more than 1 percent. I argue that it is very difficult to reconcile the slowdown in wage growth late in a worker's career with optimizing behavior unless the technology for learning on the job is such that it generates very low gains from training. The analysis is based on a nonparametric methodology for estimating the learning technology from wage profiles; the results are arrived at by comparing the lifetime income when the worker optimally invests in his human capital to the one where he does not make any investments.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 493-514
Author(s):  
Christiane Roller ◽  
Christian Rulff ◽  
Michael M. Tamminga

AbstractThe career mobility model suggests that overeducated workers are more prone to take up on-the-job training, to climb up the career ladder, or to leave to professions more suitable to their educational level. Our empirical analysis, using the German SOEP, confirms this theory for Germany. Comparing adequately qualified and overqualified workers in jobs that require the same level of formal qualification indicates that overeducated workers have a higher probability to take up on-the-job training and have a higher probability to move to jobs that better match their educational level. Furthermore, we find that overeducated workers experience higher wage growth than their adequately educated colleagues.


Author(s):  
Daron Acemoglu ◽  
Jörn-Steffen Pischke

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