Lattice BCK logics with Modus Ponens as unique rule

2014 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 230-238
Author(s):  
Joan Gispert ◽  
Antoni Torrens
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matheus Pereira Lobo

All nine axioms and a single inference rule of logic (Modus Ponens) within the Hilbert axiomatic system are presented using capital letters (ABC) in order to familiarize the beginner student in hers/his first contact with the topic.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
TaiBen Nan ◽  
Haidong Zhang ◽  
Yanping He

The overwhelming majority of existing decision-making methods combined with the Pythagorean fuzzy set (PFS) are based on aggregation operators, and their logical foundation is imperfect. Therefore, we attempt to establish two decision-making methods based on the Pythagorean fuzzy multiple I method. This paper is devoted to the discussion of the full implication multiple I method based on the PFS. We first propose the concepts of Pythagorean t-norm, Pythagorean t-conorm, residual Pythagorean fuzzy implication operator (RPFIO), Pythagorean fuzzy biresiduum, and the degree of similarity between PFSs based on the Pythagorean fuzzy biresiduum. In addition, the full implication multiple I method for Pythagorean fuzzy modus ponens (PFMP) is established, and the reversibility and continuity properties of the full implication multiple I method of PFMP are analyzed. Finally, a practical problem is discussed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Pythagorean fuzzy full implication multiple I method in a decision-making problem. The advantages of the new method over existing methods are also explained. Overall, the proposed methods are based on logical reasoning, so they can more accurately and completely express decision information.


Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1409
Author(s):  
Marija Boričić Joksimović

We give some simple examples of applying some of the well-known elementary probability theory inequalities and properties in the field of logical argumentation. A probabilistic version of the hypothetical syllogism inference rule is as follows: if propositions A, B, C, A→B, and B→C have probabilities a, b, c, r, and s, respectively, then for probability p of A→C, we have f(a,b,c,r,s)≤p≤g(a,b,c,r,s), for some functions f and g of given parameters. In this paper, after a short overview of known rules related to conjunction and disjunction, we proposed some probabilized forms of the hypothetical syllogism inference rule, with the best possible bounds for the probability of conclusion, covering simultaneously the probabilistic versions of both modus ponens and modus tollens rules, as already considered by Suppes, Hailperin, and Wagner.


1960 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. B. Angell

Axiomatizations of the sentential calculus which use Rmp (modus ponens), have been shown equivalent to axiomatizations similar in all respects except that Rmp is replaced by the less restricted rule Re (rule of excision)1:Re. If S and (…(S⊃S') …), then (… S' …).


1972 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 711-715 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krister Segerberg

Let ⊥, →, and □ be primitive, and let us have a countable supply of propositional letters. By a (modal) logic we understand a proper subset of the set of all formulas containing every tautology and being closed under modus ponens and substitution. A logic is regular if it contains every instance of □A ∧ □B ↔ □(A ∧ B) and is closed under the ruleA regular logic is normal if it contains □⊤. The smallest regular logic we denote by C (the same as Lemmon's C2), the smallest normal one by K. If L and L' are logics and L ⊆ L′, then L is a sublogic of L', and L' is an extension of L; properly so if L ≠ L'. A logic is quasi-regular (respectively, quasi-normal) if it is an extension of C (respectively, K).A logic is Post complete if it has no proper extension. The Post number, denoted by p(L), is the number of Post complete extensions of L. Thanks to Lindenbaum, we know thatThere is an obvious upper bound, too:Furthermore,.


Author(s):  
Wen-Huang Li ◽  
Feng Qin ◽  
Ai-Fang Xie
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 359 ◽  
pp. 22-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margarita Mas ◽  
Daniel Ruiz-Aguilera ◽  
Joan Torrens
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. P. Hertogh

ABSTRACT: René Descartes' Cogito is an example of a paradigmatic thought experiment, herald of both subjectivism and new science in Europe's Modern Age, that seems to have escaped the attention of thought experiment philosophers. On deep analysis, the Cogito appears as universal instantiation (or modus ponens with implicit major 'whatever has the property of thinking, exists'). The Cogito has strong rhetorical effects for it narratively generalizes from I to all human kind, and its historical and philosophical success can be explained from its concise enthymematic structure that rings true in many possible senses. We consider it a preeminent example of a thought experiment as it states the power of thinking as its very contents. From Descartes' methodology of doubt we can conclude that, e.g., on a Wittgensteinian interpretation, the Cogito is a logical thought experiment rather than a psychological one.


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