Private Benefits of Control and Dual-Class Share Unifications

2011 ◽  
Vol 32 (6) ◽  
pp. 355-369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Maury ◽  
Anete Pajuste
Keyword(s):  
Private Benefits ◽  
Private Benefits Of Control ◽  
Dual Class

Owners, Boards, Managers and the Private Benefits of Control: A Study of Dual Class Stock Firms in an Emerging Market

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Muravyev ◽  
Irina Berezinets ◽  
Yulia Ilina
Keyword(s):  
Emerging Market ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Private Benefits Of Control ◽  
Dual Class

Minority Shareholder Protections and the Private Benefits of Control for Swedish Mergers

2004 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Holmén ◽  
John D. Knopf
Keyword(s):  
Tax Compliance ◽  
Limited Evidence ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Private Benefits Of Control ◽  
Shareholder Protection ◽  
Degree Of Separation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
High Degree

AbstractSweden has a high degree of separation of ownership from control through pyramids, dual-class shares, and cross-holdings. This increases the potential for private benefits of control. However, Sweden's extralegal institutions—tax compliance and newspaper circulation—are consistent with greater shareholder protection. Using data on Swedish mergers we find limited evidence of shareholder expropriation. Apparently, Sweden's extralegal institutions offset the drawback of weak corporate governance.

Private Benefits of Control and Dual-Class Share Unifications

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Maury ◽  
Anete Pajuste
Keyword(s):  
Private Benefits ◽  
Private Benefits Of Control ◽  
Dual Class

Corporate payouts in dual classes

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (12) ◽  
pp. 1542-1562
Author(s):  
Adam Y.C. Lei ◽  
Huihua Li ◽  
Jin Yu
Keyword(s):  
Agency Problems ◽  
Share Repurchases ◽  
Share Repurchase ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Single Class ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Private Benefits Of Control ◽  
Dividend Payments ◽  
Dual Class

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the dividend payments and share repurchases of dual-class firms that have both their superior voting shares and inferior voting shares publicly traded. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses matched dual-class and single-class samples from 1994 to 2015 and logit models to evaluate the likelihoods of dividend payment and share repurchase between dual-class firms and single-class firms. Findings The results show that dual-class firms are more likely than the matched sample of single-class firms to pay dividends in both share classes. Dual-class firms, however, are more likely to repurchase their superior shares than single-class firms and their inferior shares. Research limitations/implications The results suggest that dual-class firms do not use corporate payouts to either mitigate agency problems or maintain the private benefits of control. Instead, dual-class firms use dividend payments to mitigate agency problems while using repurchases of superior shares to maintain the private benefits of control, which supports the agency payout hypothesis. Practical implications This paper highlights the differences between dividend payments and share repurchases as forms of corporate payouts and suggests that firms may choose a particular form for a particular purpose. Originality/value This paper provides the first piece of empirical evidence on the corporate payouts of dual-class firms separating their superior voting shares and inferior voting shares.

Private Benefits of Control and Control Premium

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-84
Author(s):  
Joon-Hyug Chung
Keyword(s):  
Private Benefits ◽  
Private Benefits Of Control ◽  
Control Premium ◽  
And Control
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