The Envelope Theorem and Comparative Statics of Nash Equilibria

1996 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael R. Caputo
2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Geofferey Jiyun Kim ◽  
Bara Kim

AbstractThis paper provides an analysis of a cost-averting war of attrition with minimum necessary conceders. All symmetric stationary Nash equilibria are characterized. The multiplicity of equilibria has called for further refinements. We show that there exists a unique symmetric stationary trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Comparative statics results of the trembling hand perfect equilibrium are provided. This paper’s model is motivated by the problem of delayed public goods provisions in collective action settings. Augmenting the number of minimum necessary conceders can curtail delays.


2005 ◽  
Vol 99 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
JACOB K. GOEREE ◽  
CHARLES A. HOLT

This paper characterizes behavior with “noisy” decision making for models of political interaction characterized by simultaneous binary decisions. Applications include: voting participation games, candidate entry, the volunteer's dilemma, and collective action problems with a contribution threshold. A simple graphical device is used to derive comparative statics and other theoretical properties of a “quantal response” equilibrium, and the resulting predictions are compared with Nash equilibria that arise in the limiting case of no noise. Many anomalous data patterns in laboratory experiments based on these games can be explained in this manner.


1987 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-21
Author(s):  
Michael J. Stutzer

Economica ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 57 (227) ◽  
pp. 283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael R. Baye ◽  
Thomas F. Cosimano

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 208-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Ambrus ◽  
Shih En Lu

We propose a finite-horizon continuous-time framework for coalitional bargaining, in which players can make offers at random discrete times. In our model: (i) expected payoffs in Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) are unique, generating sharp predictions and facilitating comparative statics; and (ii) MPE are the only subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) that can be approximated by SPNE of nearby discrete-time bargaining models. We investigate the limit MPE payoffs as the time horizon goes to infinity and players get infinitely patient. In convex games, we establish that the set of these limit payoffs achievable by varying recognition rates is exactly the core of the characteristic function. (JEL C78)


2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.


Author(s):  
Jamal Othman ◽  
Yaghoob Jafari

Malaysia is contemplating removal of most of her subsidy support measures including subsidies on cooking oil which is largely palm oil based. This paper aims to examine the effects of cooking oil subsidy removals on the competitiveness of the oil palm subsector and related markets. This is done by developing and applying a comparative static, multi-commodity, partial equilibrium model with multi-stages of production function for the Malaysian perennial crops subsector which explicitly links different stages of production, primary and intermediate input markets, trade, and policy linkages. Results partly suggest that export of cooking oil will increase by 0.2 per cent due to a 10 per cent cooking oil subsidy reduction, while domestic output of cooking oil may eventually see a net decline of 1.97 per cent. The results clearly point out that the effect of reducing cooking oil subsidies is relatively small at the upstream levels and therefore it only induces minute effects on factor markets. Consequently, the market for other agricultural crops is projected to change very marginally.   Keywords: Multicomodity, comparative statics, partial equilibrium model, output supply-factor markets linkages, effects of cooking oil subsidy removals.


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