The Shapley Transfer Procedure for NTU-Games

On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games

International Game Theory Review ◽

10.1142/s0219198915500085 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 17 (04) ◽

pp. 1550008 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Bezalel Peleg ◽

Peter Sudhölter

Keyword(s):

Bargaining Set ◽

Ntu Games ◽

The Core ◽

Ntu Game ◽

Bargaining Sets

We show that the Aumann–Davis–Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-leveled NTU game that is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an example that the foregoing statement may not be valid if the NTU game is marginal convex.

Download Full-text

An Implementation of the Core of NTU-Games

Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research - Theory and Decision Library ◽

10.1007/978-1-4757-2640-4_9 ◽

1997 ◽

pp. 105-111

Author(s):

Gustavo Bergantiños ◽

Jos A. M. Potters

Keyword(s):

Ntu Games ◽

The Core

Download Full-text

Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with applications to stable matchings

Discrete Optimization ◽

10.1016/j.disopt.2015.02.002 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 22 ◽

pp. 241-254 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Péter Biró ◽

Tamás Fleiner

Keyword(s):

Stable Matchings ◽

Ntu Games

Download Full-text

On Convexity For NTU-games

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.250792 ◽

2000 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Ruud Hendrickx ◽

Peter E.M. Borm ◽

Judith Timmer

Keyword(s):

Ntu Games

Download Full-text

THE EXTENSION OF DUTTA–RAY'S SOLUTION TO CONVEX NTU GAMES

International Game Theory Review ◽

10.1142/s0219198910002714 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 12 (04) ◽

pp. 339-361

Author(s):

ELENA YANOVSKAYA

Keyword(s):

Axiomatic Characterization ◽

Convexity Property ◽

Tu Games ◽

Ntu Games ◽

The Core ◽

Egalitarian Solution

The egalitarian solution for the class of convex TU games was defined by Dutta and Ray [1989] and axiomatized by Dutta 1990. An extension of this solution — the egalitarian split-off set (ESOS) — to the class of non-levelled NTU games is proposed. On the class of TU games it coincides with the egalitarian split-off set [Branzei et al. 2006]. The proposed extension is axiomatized as the maximal (w.r.t. inclusion) solution satisfying consistency à la Hart–Mas-Colell and agreeing with the solution of constrained egalitarianism for arbitrary two-person games. For ordinal convex NTU games the ESOS turns out to be single-valued and contained in the core. The totally cardinal convexity property of NTU games is defined. For the class of ordinal and total cardinal convex NTU games an axiomatic characterization of the Dutta–Ray solution with the help of Peleg consistency is given.

Download Full-text