scholarly journals On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (04) ◽  
pp. 1550008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bezalel Peleg ◽  
Peter Sudhölter
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Set ◽  
Ntu Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Ntu Game ◽  
Bargaining Sets

We show that the Aumann–Davis–Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-leveled NTU game that is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an example that the foregoing statement may not be valid if the NTU game is marginal convex.

ON BARGAINING SETS IN SYMMETRIC GAMES

2007 ◽  
Vol 09 (02) ◽  
pp. 199-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARC MEERTENS ◽  
J. A. M. POTTERS ◽  
J. H. REIJNIERSE
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Set ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Symmetric Games ◽  
Bargaining Sets ◽  
Additional Assumptions

The paper investigates under which additional assumptions the bargaining set, the reactive bargaining set or the semireactive bargaining set coincides with the core on the class of symmetric TU-games. Furthermore, we give an example which illustrates that the property 'the bargaining set coincides with the core' is not a prosperity property.

THE EXTENDED CORE OF A COOPERATIVE NTU GAME

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (03) ◽  
pp. 263-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
HANS KEIDING ◽  
YAROSLAVNA PANKRATOVA
Keyword(s):  
Solution Concept ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Ntu Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Ntu Game ◽  
Straightforward Generalization

In this paper we propose an extension of the core of NTU games from its domain to a larger set of games satisfying a few conditions of well-behavedness. The solution concept is a rather straightforward generalization of the extended core of TU games introduced by Gomez [2003] and is shown to have similar properties. Also, a set of axioms for solutions of NTU games is presented which characterizes the extended core.

An Implementation of the Core of NTU-Games

1997 ◽  
pp. 105-111
Author(s):  
Gustavo Bergantiños ◽  
Jos A. M. Potters
Keyword(s):  
Ntu Games ◽  
The Core

scholarly journals THE POSITIVE PREKERNEL OF A COOPERATIVE GAME

2000 ◽  
Vol 02 (04) ◽  
pp. 287-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER SUDHÖLTER ◽  
BEZALEL PELEG
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Transferable Utility ◽  
Bargaining Set ◽  
The Core ◽  
Reduced Game ◽  
Positive Kernel ◽  
Game Property ◽  
Transferable Utility Games

The positive prekernel, a solution of cooperative transferable utility games, is introduced. We show that this solution inherits many properties of the prekernel and of the core, which are both sub-solutions. It coincides with its individually rational variant, the positive kernel, when applied to any zero-monotonic game. The positive (pre)kernel is a sub-solution of the reactive (pre)bargaining set. We prove that the positive prekernel on the set of games with players belonging to a universe of at least three possible members can be axiomatized by non-emptiness, anonymity, reasonableness, the weak reduced game property, the converse reduced game property, and a weak version of unanimity for two-person games.

On the core, nucleolus and bargaining sets of cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (6) ◽  
pp. 6129-6142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xia Zhang ◽  
Hao Sun ◽  
Genjiu Xu ◽  
Dongshuang Hou
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Bargaining Sets

The core and the bargaining set in glove-market games

2003 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yevgenia Apartsin ◽  
Ron Holzman
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Set ◽  
Market Games ◽  
The Core

THE EXTENSION OF DUTTA–RAY'S SOLUTION TO CONVEX NTU GAMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (04) ◽  
pp. 339-361
Author(s):  
ELENA YANOVSKAYA
Keyword(s):  
Axiomatic Characterization ◽  
Convexity Property ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Ntu Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Egalitarian Solution

The egalitarian solution for the class of convex TU games was defined by Dutta and Ray [1989] and axiomatized by Dutta 1990. An extension of this solution — the egalitarian split-off set (ESOS) — to the class of non-levelled NTU games is proposed. On the class of TU games it coincides with the egalitarian split-off set [Branzei et al. 2006]. The proposed extension is axiomatized as the maximal (w.r.t. inclusion) solution satisfying consistency à la Hart–Mas-Colell and agreeing with the solution of constrained egalitarianism for arbitrary two-person games. For ordinal convex NTU games the ESOS turns out to be single-valued and contained in the core. The totally cardinal convexity property of NTU games is defined. For the class of ordinal and total cardinal convex NTU games an axiomatic characterization of the Dutta–Ray solution with the help of Peleg consistency is given.

Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games

2006 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 557-568 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan-An Hwang
Keyword(s):  
Ntu Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Egalitarian Solution

On the Core, Bargaining Set and the Set of Competitive Allocations of Fuzzy Exchange Economy with a Continuum of Agents

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (06) ◽  
pp. 1003-1021
Author(s):  
Xia Zhang ◽  
Hao Sun ◽  
Moses Olabhele Esangbedo
Keyword(s):  
Real Life ◽  
Exchange Economy ◽  
Initial Endowment ◽  
Bargaining Set ◽  
New Model ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Core ◽  
Fuzzy Core ◽  
Fuzzy Preference

In this paper, we present a new model closer to the real-life — called the fuzzy exchange economy with a continuum of agents (FXE-CA) — that combines fuzzy consumption and fuzzy initial endowment with the agent’s fuzzy preference in the fuzzy consumption set. To characterize the fuzzy competitive allocations of the FXE-CA, we define the indifference fuzzy core of a FXE-CA as the set of all fuzzy allocations that cannot be dominated by any coalition of agents. We also propose the Mas-Colell indifference fuzzy bargaining set, in which no coalition has a justified objection at a fuzzy allocation against any other coalition. Finally, we verify that the indifference fuzzy core and the indifference fuzzy bargaining set of a FXE-CA coincide with the set of all fuzzy competitive allocations under some conditions, respectively. This indicates that the agents unanimously distribute the fuzzy competitive allocations of a FXE-CA.

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