The Median Voter Model

2008 ◽  
pp. 707-712 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger D. Congleton
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Voter Model ◽  
Median Voter Model

Budget-Maximizing Bureaucracy and the Effects of State Aid on School Expenditures

1981 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H. Beck
Keyword(s):  
School Districts ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Voter Model ◽  
School Expenditures ◽  
Median Voter Model ◽  
Theoretical Considerations

This article estimates expenditure equations for Michigan school districts using Kelejian's (1971) procedure for dealing with the endogenous state aid variables. Alternative specifications of the expenditure equation are derived, based on (i) a median voter model and (ii) Niskanen's (1971) budget-maximizing model. Theoretical considerations imply different specifications of the aid variables than have been used in previous empirical work. The estimated effect of grants-in-aid is a larger increase in expenditures than is consistent with model (i) but less than is consistent with model (ii).

Voting for Wage Concessions: The Case of the 1982 GM-UAW Negotiations

ILR Review ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce E. Kaufman ◽  
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Labor Relations ◽  
Voter Model ◽  
Median Voter Model ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Stable Employment ◽  
The Empirical Analysis

The authors of this paper use the median voter model to predict the patterns of rank-and-file voting on wage concessions in a multiplant setting, then test those predictions using data from the 1982 GM-UAW negotiations. The model predicts that workers in plants with large layoffs will vote in favor of a wage concession only if they believe that a concession will save their jobs. Surprisingly, workers in plants with growing or stable employment are also actually more likely to vote Yes. A third prediction is that the Yes vote will be smallest in plants with the most adversarial labor relations. The empirical analysis supports all three predictions.

Partisan agenda control in the US house: A theoretical exploration

2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 555-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffery A Jenkins ◽  
Nathan W Monroe
Keyword(s):  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Voter Model ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Party Government ◽  
The Us ◽  
Median Voter Model ◽  
Party Members

While a number of scholars have focused on the importance of partisan agenda control in the US House, few have examined its uneven consequences within the majority party. In this paper, we explore ‘counterfactual’ utility distributions within the majority party, by comparing policy outcomes under a party-less median voter model to policy outcomes under party-based positive and negative agenda control models. We show that the distribution of policy losses and benefits resulting from agenda control are quite similar for both the positive and negative varieties. In both cases, moderate majority-party members are made worse off by the exercise of partisan agenda control, while those to the extreme side of the majority-party median benefit disproportionately. We also consider the benefit of agenda control for the party as a whole, by looking at the way changes in majority-party homogeneity affect the summed utility across members. Interestingly, we find that when the distance between the floor and majority-party medians decreases, the overall value of positive and negative agenda control diminishes. However, we also find support for the ‘conditional party government’ notion that, as majority-party members’ preferences become more similar, they have an increased incentive to grant agenda-setting power to their leaders.

scholarly journals Competition between Specialized Candidates

2010 ◽  
Vol 104 (4) ◽  
pp. 745-765 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEFAN KRASA ◽  
MATTIAS POLBORN
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Voter Model ◽  
Unique Equilibrium ◽  
Political Experience ◽  
Median Voter Model ◽  
Political Office ◽  
Political Capabilities

Opposing candidates for a political office often differ in their professional backgrounds and previous political experience, leading to both real and perceived differences in political capabilities. We analyze a formal model in which candidates with different productivities in two policy areas compete for voters by choosing how much money or effort they would allocate to each area if elected. The model has a unique equilibrium that differs substantially from the standard median voter model. Although candidates compete for the support of a moderate voter type, this cutoff voter differs from the expected median voter. Moreover, no voter type except the cutoff voter is indifferent between the candidates in equilibrium. The model also predicts that candidates respond to changes in the preferences of voters in a very rigid way. From a welfare perspective, candidates are “excessively moderate”: almost certainly, a majority of voters would prefer that the winning candidate focus more on his or her strength.

A Spatially Autoregressive Median Voter Model of Recreation Expenditures

1993 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
James C. Murdoch ◽  
Morteza Rahmatian ◽  
Mark A. Thayer
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Voter Model ◽  
Median Voter Model

scholarly journals Reconciling Observed Tariffs and the Median Voter Model

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
Swati Dhingra
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Voter Model ◽  
Median Voter Model
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