What Does Codetermination Do?

The authors provide a comprehensive overview of codetermination, that is, worker representation in firms’ governance and management. The available micro evidence points to zero or small positive effects of codetermination on worker and firm outcomes and leaves room for moderate positive effects on productivity, wages, and job stability. The authors also present new country-level, general-equilibrium event studies of codetermination reforms between the 1960s and 2010s, finding no effects on aggregate economic outcomes or the quality of industrial relations. They offer three explanations for the institution’s limited impact. First, existing codetermination laws convey little authority to workers. Second, countries with codetermination laws have high baseline levels of informal worker voice. Third, codetermination laws may interact with other labor market institutions, such as union representation and collective bargaining. The article closes with a discussion of the implications for recent codetermination proposals in the United States.

Racial Differences in Time at Work Not Working

Racial differences in effort at work, if they exist, can potentially explain race-based wage/earnings disparities in the labor market. The authors estimate specifications of time spent on non-work activities at work by Black and White males and females with data from the American Time Use Survey. Estimates reveal that trivially small differences occur between non-Hispanic Black and non-Hispanic White males in time spent not working while on the job that disappear entirely when correcting for non-response errors. The findings imply that Black–White male differences in the fraction of the workday spent not working are either not large enough to partially explain the Black–White wage gap, or simply do not exist at all.

Persistent Unpredictability: Analyzing Experiences with the First Statewide Scheduling Legislation in Oregon

Based on 98 in-depth interviews with workers and managers, the authors analyze the effectiveness of Oregon’s Fair Workweek Act, the first statewide scheduling legislation. Overall, findings show limited evidence of the law’s efficacy to improve workers’ schedules. The authors discuss three factors that are likely to explain this shortcoming: lack of adequate funding for education about the law and for enforcement, the inclusion of provisions that undermine the intent of fair scheduling legislation, and the ability of employers to interpret the law with substantial leeway. In this context, the authors consider the persistence of unpredictable scheduling practices a form of “flexible discipline,” even under Fair Workweek legislation. This article contributes to the literature on unpredictable scheduling by showing that in order to address this problem, legislation must include robust funding for education, implementation, and enforcement and must avoid options for workers to waive their rights to predictability pay, which as part of the act is intended to compensate employees for last-minute schedule changes.

Uncertain Time: Precarious Schedules and Job Turnover in the US Service Sector

The authors develop a model of cumulative disadvantage relating three axes of disadvantage for hourly workers in the US retail and food service sectors: schedule instability, turnover, and earnings. In this model, exposure to unstable work schedules disrupts workers’ family and economic lives, straining the employment relation and increasing the likelihood of turnover, which can then lead to earnings losses. Drawing on new panel data from 1,827 hourly workers in retail and food service collected as part of the Shift Project, the authors demonstrate that exposure to schedule instability is a strong, robust predictor of turnover for workers with relatively unstable schedules (about one-third of the sample). Slightly less than half of this relationship is mediated by job satisfaction and another quarter by work–family conflict. Job turnover is generally associated with earnings losses due to unemployment, but workers leaving jobs with moderately unstable schedules experience earnings growth upon re-employment.

The China Shock, Employment Protection, and European Jobs

The authors investigate the effects of Chinese import competition on transitions into and out of employment using comparable worker-level data for 14 European countries. Results indicate that, on average, Chinese imports are associated with an increased probability that employed workers become unemployed and with a reduction in worker flows from unemployment to employment. In countries with high levels of employment protection, incumbent workers are shielded against the risk of job loss due to Chinese competition, but unemployed workers’ prospects seem to be particularly negatively affected in these countries. The authors also provide evidence that the effects of increased Chinese imports differ by worker groups and the tasks performed on the job.

Immigration Policy and the Rise of Self-Employment among Mexican Immigrants

The recent dramatic growth in self-employment among Mexican immigrants in the United States in the past two decades is a puzzling trend, in stark contrast to the stagnant growth or even decline among other demographic groups. The authors propose that the expansion of interior immigration enforcement, a characteristic of the US immigration policy during that time span, contributed to this unique trend by pushing Mexican immigrants into self-employment as an alternative livelihood. Exploiting temporal and geographic variation in immigration enforcement measures from 2005 to 2017, the authors show that tougher enforcement has been responsible for approximately 15% of the rise in Mexican self-employment in the United States.

Inside Jobs: Salary Setting for Immigrants Crossing Establishment, Organizational, and National Boundaries

Using novel US Department of Labor administrative records, the authors test theoretical mechanisms to account for variation in immigrant workers’ starting salaries following key career transitions. Specifically, they examine differences in the base starting salaries and discretionary starting salary increases above these base starting salaries for 1) same-establishment hires, relative to 2) US-based establishment transfers, 3) international establishment transfers, 4) US-based external hires, and 5) international external hires. In support of the “insider premium” account, findings show that same-establishment hires tend to work in jobs with greater requirements, and thus higher base starting salaries. In partial support of the “outsider premium” account, findings show that US-based external hires receive larger starting salary increases than do same-establishment hires, conditional on the jobs they enter. This said, international external hires receive smaller starting salary increases than do same-establishment hires. Findings reveal distinct mechanisms, acting separately or in tandem, during salary-setting processes.

The Effect of E-Verify Laws on Crime

E-Verify laws, which have been adopted by 23 states, require employers to verify whether new employees are eligible to legally work prior to employment. This study explores the impact of state E-Verify laws on crime. Using data from the 2004–2015 National Incident Based Reporting System, the authors find that the enactment of E-Verify is associated with a 7% reduction in property crime incidents involving Hispanic arrestees. This finding was strongest for universal E-Verify mandates that extend to private employers and its external validity bolstered by evidence from the Uniform Crime Reports. Supplemental analyses from the Current Population Survey suggest two mechanisms to explain this result: E-Verify-induced increases in the employment of low-skilled natives of Hispanic descent and out-migration of younger Hispanics. Findings show no evidence that arrests were displaced to nearby jurisdictions without E-Verify or that violent crime or arrests of African Americans were affected by E-Verify laws. The magnitudes of the estimates suggest that E-Verify laws averted $491 million in property crime costs to the United States.