Reduced Game Property of Linear Values with Equal Treatment Property

Author(s):  
Tsuneyuki Namekata ◽  
Theo S.H. Driessen
2000 ◽  
Vol 02 (04) ◽  
pp. 287-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER SUDHÖLTER ◽  
BEZALEL PELEG

The positive prekernel, a solution of cooperative transferable utility games, is introduced. We show that this solution inherits many properties of the prekernel and of the core, which are both sub-solutions. It coincides with its individually rational variant, the positive kernel, when applied to any zero-monotonic game. The positive (pre)kernel is a sub-solution of the reactive (pre)bargaining set. We prove that the positive prekernel on the set of games with players belonging to a universe of at least three possible members can be axiomatized by non-emptiness, anonymity, reasonableness, the weak reduced game property, the converse reduced game property, and a weak version of unanimity for two-person games.


1992 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Maschler ◽  
J. A. M. Potters ◽  
S. H. Tijs
Keyword(s):  

Top ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-185
Author(s):  
Theo S. H. Driessen
Keyword(s):  
Tu Games ◽  

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