Climate Change Sustainability: From Bargaining to Cooperative Balanced Approach

This work aims to provide different perspectives on the relationships between cooperative game theory and the research field concerning climate change dynamics. New results are obtained in the framework of competitive bargaining solutions and related issues, moving from a cooperative approach to a competitive one. Furthermore, the dynamics of balanced and super-balanced games are exposed, with particular reference to coalitions. Some open problems are presented to aid future research in this area.

On a class of linear-state differential games with subgame individually rational and time consistent bargaining solutions

We consider n-person pure bargaining games in which the space of feasible payoffs is constructed via a normal form differential game. At the beginning of the game the agents bargain over strategies to be played over an infinite time horizon. An initial cooperative solution (a strategy tuple) is called subgame individually rational (SIR) if it remains individually rational throughout the entire game and time consistent (TC) if renegotiating it at a later time instant yields the original solution. For a class of linear-state differential games we show that any solution which is individually rational at the beginning of the game satisfies SIR and TC if the space of admissible cooperative strategies is restricted to constants. We discuss an application from environmental economics.

Heterogeneous Network Spectrum Allocation Scheme for Network-Assisted D2D Communications

To meet the drastic growth of mobile traffic, next-generation wireless networks integrate existing technologies such as dual-connectivity (DC) and network-assisted device-to-device (D2D) communications. In this paper, we present a new spectrum allocation scheme for a heterogeneous system, which incorporates both technologies. For the effective collaboration of individual network agents, we employ the ideas of cooperative games, and the spectrum allocation algorithm is implemented as a novel joint-bargaining process. Based on the bargaining solutions of classical Nash, weighted Nash, and Nash bargaining with coalition structure, our three-step interactive approach can leverage the full synergy of different bargaining concepts. Under the dynamic changing HetNet environments, we can take various benefits in a rational way while handling comprehensively the DC-based D2D communication issue and reach an agreement that gives mutual advantage. The main novelty of our proposed scheme is to ensure a relevant tradeoff between conflicting requirements during HetNet operations. Finally, we conduct extensive simulation study and illustrate that the proposed scheme provides a considerable performance improvement by comparison with the existing protocols.

Addressing the supply-demand gap in shared rivers using water diplomacy framework: utility of game theory in the Indus river within Pakistan

The question of how to govern and manage transboundary river basin for competing and often conflicting demands due to limited supplies continues to be an issue of concern, conflict, and cooperation. A key novelty of this paper is the use of the Water Diplomacy Framework (WDF) to address supply-demand mismatch using the notion of collaborative problem-solving and joint fact-finding. It builds on innovative applications of game-theoretic approaches and uses equity and sustainability as guiding principles to address the supply-demand mismatch. Five different bankruptcy methods (net benefit ranges between US$17,462M to US$18,201M) and the Nash Bargaining Solution (net benefit ranges between US$18,132M to US$19,216M) are used to resolve supply-demand mismatch in the Indus basin among four provinces within Pakistan. The maximum total benefit generated from the Nash Bargaining Solution is 5.5% higher compared to the best bankruptcy method. Moving from the non-cooperative and rule-based bankruptcy methods to the Nash Bargaining Solutions provided increased benefit for all stakeholders. Reallocation of these increased benefits among the four provinces is done by applying the Nash Bargaining Solutions for homogenous and heterogeneous weights. These findings suggest that aspects of WDF – cooperative problem-solving approaches involving joint fact-finding and exploring different options – has the potential to simultaneously resolve supply-demand mismatch and generate more benefits for all stakeholders.