Axiomatic results and dynamic processes for two weighted indexes under fuzzy transferable-utility behavior

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>By considering the supreme-utilities and the weights simultaneously under fuzzy behavior, we propose two indexes on fuzzy transferable-utility games. In order to present the rationality for these two indexes, we define extended reductions to offer several axiomatic results and dynamics processes. Based on different consideration, we also adopt excess functions to propose alternative formulations and related dynamic processes for these two indexes respectively.</p>

Hart–Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games

This paper formally introduces Hart–Mas-Colell consistency for general (possibly multi-valued) solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility. This notion is used to axiomatically characterize the core on the domain of convex games. Moreover, we characterize all nonempty solutions satisfying individual rationality, anonymity, scale covariance, superadditivity, weak Hart–Mas-Colell consistency, and converse Hart–Mas-Colell consistency. This family consists of (a) the Shapley value, (b) all homothetic images of the core with the Shapley value as center of homothety and with positive ratios of homothety not larger than one, and (c) their relative interiors.

Harsanyi support levels solutions

We introduce a new class of values for TU-games (games with transferable utility) with a level structure, called LS-games. A level structure is a hierarchical structure where each level corresponds to a partition of the player set, which becomes increasingly coarse from the trivial partition containing only singletons to the partition containing only the grand coalition. The new values, called Harsanyi support levels solutions, extend the Harsanyi solutions for LS-games. As an important subset of the class of these values, we present the class of weighted Shapley support levels values as a further result. The values from this class extend the weighted Shapley values for LS-games and contain the Shapley levels value as a special case. Axiomatizations of the studied classes are provided.

Sustainability for utility allocation: a game-theoretical mechanism

By focusing on various influences arose from environmental change, sustainability has become a major conception among many fields, including utility allocation. On the other hand, game-theoretical methods have always been adopted to analyze the reasonability of utility allocation rules. In many real-world situations, however, participants and its energetic levels (decisions) should be essential factors simultaneously. By focusing on both the participants and its energetic levels (decisions), we introduce the restrained core to investigate utility allocation under fuzzy transferable-utility (TU) models. In order to analyze the reasonability for the restrained core, two axiomatic results are further provided by applying several types of reductions. Since the restrained core infringes a specific converse steadiness property, a converse steady enlargement of the restrained core is also introduced to investigate how extensive the violation of this specific converse steadiness property is. This converse steady enlargement is smallest converse steady measuration that contains the restrained core.

A weighted power distribution mechanism under fuzzy behavior systems

In real situations, players might represent administrative areas of different scales; players might have different activity abilities. Thus, we propose an extension of the Banzhaf-Owen index in the framework of fuzzy transferable-utility games by considering supreme-utilities and weights simultaneously, which we name the weighted fuzzy Banzhaf-Owen index. Here we adopt three existing notions from traditional game theory and reinterpret them in the framework of fuzzy transferable-utility games. The first one is that this weighted index could be represented as an alternative formulation in terms of excess functions. The second is that, based on an reduced game and related consistency, we offer an axiomatic result to present the rationality of this weighted index. Finally, we introduce two dynamic processes to illustrate that this weighted index could be reached by players who start from an arbitrary efficient payoff vector and make successive adjustments.

Pairwise Stable Matching in Large Economies

We formulate a stability notion for two‐sided pairwise matching problems with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Matchings are formulated as joint distributions over the characteristics of the populations to be matched. Spaces of characteristics can be high‐dimensional and need not be compact. Stable matchings exist with and without transfers, and stable matchings correspond precisely to limits of stable matchings for finite‐agent models. We can embed existing continuum matching models and stability notions with transferable utility as special cases of our model and stability notion. In contrast to finite‐agent matching models, stable matchings exist under a general class of externalities.