Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does not Know Endowments or Production Sets

1995 ◽  
pp. 367-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonid Hurwicz ◽  
Eric Maskin ◽  
Andrew Postlewaite
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Nash Implementation ◽  
Social Choice Rules

scholarly journals Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization

2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 871-904 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Lombardi ◽  
Naoki Yoshihara
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Complete Characterization ◽  
Choice Rule ◽  
Social Choice Rule ◽  
Nash Implementation ◽  
Full Characterization ◽  
Material Interest ◽  
Welfare Implications ◽  
Social Choice Rules

Abstract A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, “Do not lie if you do not have to”, to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of $$ n\ge 3$$ n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper offers a complete characterization of the (unanimous) social choice rules that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. When all individuals are partially-honest, then any (unanimous) rule is partially-honestly Nash implementable. An account of the welfare implications of partially-honest Nash implementation is provided in a variety of environments.

scholarly journals Social choice rules driven by propositional logic

2013 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-312
Author(s):  
Rosa Camps ◽  
Xavier Mora ◽  
Laia Saumell
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Social Choice Rules

On combining implementable social choice rules

2007 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Pierre Benoît ◽  
Efe A. Ok ◽  
M. Remzi Sanver
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Social Choice Rules

Three Social Choice Rules

2017 ◽  
pp. 54-71
Author(s):  
Andrei Marius Vlăducu
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Choice Rule ◽  
Borda Count ◽  
Social Choice Rule ◽  
Status Quo Bias ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
The People ◽  
Viable Solution ◽  
Social Choice Rules

The authors analyze three social choice rules (plurality voting, approval voting and Borda count) from a behavioral economics perspective aiming three objectives: 1) if it is a viable solution to use these procedures during mass elections; 2) why individuals prefer a specific social choice rule and not another; 3) how status quo bias and framing effect influence the preference of individuals for a certain social choice rule. The research is conducted with 87 participants to a lab experiment and data suggest that for using approval voting and Borda count during mass elections is necessary to increase the people level of information about their benefits. When making a decision in a political or economic context seem that people tend to prefer simple plurality rule do to its availability and maybe because of its strong reliance with status quo bias.

scholarly journals On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules

2008 ◽  
Vol 14 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 17-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus-Jochen Haake ◽  
Walter Trockel
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Maskin Monotonicity ◽  
Social Choice Rules
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