Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium Points in Non-Anonymous Games

1997 ◽  
pp. 113-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Ali Khan ◽  
Kali P. Rath ◽  
Yeneng Sun
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Points ◽  
Anonymous Games ◽  
Strategy Nash Equilibrium

ON COURNOT COMPETITION UNDER RANDOM YIELD

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (04) ◽  
pp. 1350007 ◽  
Author(s):  
XIAOMING YAN ◽  
YONG WANG
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Cournot Competition ◽  
Random Yield ◽  
Cournot Model ◽  
Random Capacity ◽  
Strategy Nash Equilibrium

We look at a Cournot model in which each firm may be unreliable with random capacity, so the total quantity brought into market is uncertain. The Cournot model has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), in which the number of active firms is determined by each firm's production cost and reliability. Our results indicate the following effects of unreliability: the number of active firms in the NE is more than that each firm is completely reliable and the expected total quantity brought into market is less than that each firm is completely reliable. Whether a given firm joins in the game is independent of its reliability, but any given firm always hopes that the less-expensive firms' capacities are random and stochastically smaller.

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