Cost-Sharing Mechanism Design for Social Cost Minimization in Ridesharing Systems

2021 ◽  
pp. 277-289
Author(s):  
Yangsu Liu ◽  
Chaoli Zhang ◽  
Zhenzhe Zheng ◽  
Guihai Chen
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Social Cost ◽  
Cost Minimization

Cost-sharing mechanism design for ride-sharing

2021 ◽  
Vol 150 ◽  
pp. 410-434
Author(s):  
Shichun Hu ◽  
Maged M. Dessouky ◽  
Nelson A. Uhan ◽  
Phebe Vayanos
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Ride Sharing

Mechanism design for coalition formation and cost sharing in group-buying markets

2004 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 341-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cuihong Li ◽  
Shuchi Chawla ◽  
Uday Rajan ◽  
Katia Sycara
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Group Buying

scholarly journals Truthful Incentive Mechanisms for Social Cost Minimization in Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems

Sensors ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 481 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhuojun Duan ◽  
Mingyuan Yan ◽  
Zhipeng Cai ◽  
Xiaoming Wang ◽  
Meng Han ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Cost ◽  
Cost Minimization ◽  
Incentive Mechanisms ◽  
Mobile Crowdsourcing

Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 17-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Georgiou ◽  
Chaitanya Swamy
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Black Box

scholarly journals A Polynomial-time, Truthful, Individually Rational and Budget Balanced Ridesharing Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatsuya Iwase ◽  
Sebastian Stein ◽  
Enrico H. Gerding
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Polynomial Time ◽  
Social Cost ◽  
Common Origin ◽  
The Right

Ridesharing has great potential to improve transportation efficiency while reducing congestion and pollution. To realize this potential, mechanisms are needed that allocate vehicles optimally and provide the right incentives to riders. However, many existing approaches consider restricted settings (e.g., only one rider per vehicle or a common origin for all riders). Moreover, naive applications of standard approaches, such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves or greedy mechanisms, cannot achieve a polynomial-time, truthful, individually rational and budget balanced mechanism. To address this, we formulate a general ridesharing problem and apply mechanism design to develop a novel mechanism which satisfies all four properties and whose social cost is within 8.6% of the optimal on average.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document