Constructive and Mechanised Meta-Theory of Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic

In this paper I study intentions of the form ‘I intend that we . . .’, that is, intentions with a we-content, and their role in interpersonal coordination. I focus on the notion of epistemic support for such intentions. Using tools from epistemic game theory and epistemic logic, I cast doubt on whether such support guarantees the other agents' conditional mediation in the achievement of such intentions, something that appears important if intentions with a we-content are to count as genuine intentions. I then formulate a stronger version of epistemic support, one that does indeed ensure the required mediation, but I then argue that it rests on excessively strong informational conditions. In view of this I provide an alternative set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for coordination in games, and I argue that these conditions constitute a plausible alternative to the proposed notion of epistemic support.

Download Full-text

Changing the Axioms: Between Theory and Meta-Theory

Aesthetics and Economics ◽

10.1007/978-94-015-8236-0_4 ◽

1993 ◽

pp. 61-83

Author(s):

Gianfranco Mossetto

Keyword(s):

Meta Theory

Download Full-text

Topo-Logic as a Dynamic-Epistemic Logic

Logic, Rationality, and Interaction - Lecture Notes in Computer Science ◽

10.1007/978-3-662-55665-8_23 ◽

2017 ◽

pp. 330-346 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

Alexandru Baltag ◽

Aybüke Özgün ◽

Ana Lucia Vargas Sandoval

Keyword(s):

Epistemic Logic ◽

Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Download Full-text

Epistemic Logic with Evidence and Relevant Alternatives

Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game-Theoretical Semantics - Outstanding Contributions to Logic ◽

10.1007/978-3-319-62864-6_22 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 535-555 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Zhaoqing Xu ◽

Bo Chen

Keyword(s):

Epistemic Logic ◽

Relevant Alternatives

Download Full-text

EPISTEMIC LOGIC AND INFORMATION UPDATE

Philosophy of Information ◽

10.1016/b978-0-444-51726-5.50015-7 ◽

2008 ◽

pp. 361-455 ◽

Cited By ~ 14

Author(s):

Alexandru Baltag ◽

Hans P. van Ditmarsch ◽

Lawrence S. Moss

Keyword(s):

Epistemic Logic ◽

Information Update

Download Full-text

“What makes a reasoning sound” is the proof of its truth: A reconstruction of Peirce’s semiotics as epistemic logic, and why he did not complete his realistic revolution

Semiotica ◽

10.1515/sem-2016-0086 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 2018 (221) ◽

pp. 29-52

Author(s):

Dan Nesher

Keyword(s):

Epistemic Logic ◽

Inductive Logic ◽

Physical Reality ◽

Perceptual Judgment ◽

External Reality ◽

Complete Proof ◽

Abductive Logic ◽

Pure Mathematics ◽

True Representation ◽

Logic Of Evaluation

AbstractCharles S. Peirce attempted to develop his semiotic theory of cognitive signs interpretation, which are originated in our basic perceptual operations that quasi-prove the truth of perceptual judgment representing reality. The essential problem was to explain how, by a cognitive interpretation of the sequence of perceptual signs, we can represent external physical reality and reflectively represent our cognitive mind’s operations of signs. With his phaneroscopy introspection, Peirce shows how, without going outside our cognitions, we can represent external reality. Hence Peirce can avoid the Berkeleyian, Humean, and Kantian phenomenologies, as well as the modern analytic philosophy and hermeneutic phenomenology. Peirce showed that with the trio of semiotic interpretation – abductive logic of discovery of hypotheses, deductive logic of necessary inference, and inductive logic of evaluation – we can reach a complete proof of the true representation of reality. This semiotic logic of reasoning is the epistemic logic representing human confrontation in reality, with which we can achieve knowledge and conduct our behavior. However, Peirce did not complete his realistic revolution to eliminate previously accepted nominalistic and idealistic epistemologies of formal logic and pure mathematics. Here, I inquire why Peirce did not complete his historical realist epistemological revolution and following that inquiry I attempt to reconstruct it.

Download Full-text