INTERPERSONAL COORDINATION AND EPISTEMIC SUPPORT FOR INTENTIONS WITH WE-CONTENT

2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Roy
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
The Other ◽  
Interpersonal Coordination ◽  
Epistemic Game Theory ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Alternative Set

In this paper I study intentions of the form ‘I intend that we . . .’, that is, intentions with a we-content, and their role in interpersonal coordination. I focus on the notion of epistemic support for such intentions. Using tools from epistemic game theory and epistemic logic, I cast doubt on whether such support guarantees the other agents' conditional mediation in the achievement of such intentions, something that appears important if intentions with a we-content are to count as genuine intentions. I then formulate a stronger version of epistemic support, one that does indeed ensure the required mediation, but I then argue that it rests on excessively strong informational conditions. In view of this I provide an alternative set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for coordination in games, and I argue that these conditions constitute a plausible alternative to the proposed notion of epistemic support.

scholarly journals OK or not OK? Commitments in acknowledgments and corrections

2016 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 595 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antoine Venant ◽  
Nicholas Asher
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Formal Semantics ◽  
The Other ◽  
Discourse Structure ◽  
Full Description ◽  
Epistemic Game Theory ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Description Language ◽  
Propositional Language ◽  
Points Of View

While a semantics without differing “points of view” of different agents is a good first hypothesis for the analysis of the content of monologue, dialogues typically involve differing points of view from different agents. In particular one agent may not agree with what another agent asserts, or may have a different interpretation of an utterance from that of its author. An adequate semantics for dialogue should proceed by attributing to different dialogue agents separate views of the contents of their conversation. We model this, following others, by assigning each agent her own commitment slate. In this paper we bring out a complication with this approach that has gone so far unnoticed in formal semantics and the prior work we just mentioned, albeit it is well-known from epistemic game theory: commitment slates interact; agents typically commit to the fact that other agents make certain commitments. We thus formulate the semantics of dialogue moves and conversational goals in terms of nested, public commitments. We develop two semantics for nested commitments, one for a simple propositional language, the other for a full description language for the discourse structure of dialogues; and we show how one is an approximation of the other. We apply this formal setting to provide a unified account of different linguistic problems: the problem of ambiguity and the problem of acknowledgments and grounding. We also briefly discuss the problem of corrections and how to integrate them in our framework.

THE POWER OF KNOWLEDGE IN GAMES

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (04) ◽  
pp. 1340030 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROHIT PARIKH ◽  
ÇAĞIL TAŞDEMİR ◽  
ANDREAS WITZEL
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Game Theory ◽  
Knowledge States ◽  
States Of Knowledge

We propose a theory of the interaction between knowledge and games. Epistemic game theory is of course a well-developed subject but there is also a need for a theory of how some agents can affect the outcome of a game by affecting the knowledge which other agents have and thereby affecting their actions. We concentrate on games of incomplete or imperfect information, and study how conservative, moderate, or aggressive players might play such games. We provide models for the behavior of a knowledge manipulator who seeks to manipulate the knowledge states of active players in order to affect their moves and to maximize her own payoff even while she herself remains inactive, except for influencing the states of knowledge of the other players.

Sports News, Commentary and Interviews, From the Other Side: Journalists Seen Through the Eyes of Athletes

2021 ◽  
pp. 216747952199237
Author(s):  
Ondřej Trunečka
Keyword(s):  
Athletic Performance ◽  
The Other ◽  
Professional Athletes ◽  
Main Role ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
The Media ◽  
Sports News

This study explores how professional athletes perceive sports journalists and the role of the media. They acknowledge that communication with journalists is an essential part of their profession and appreciate the verified information, knowledge, and dutiful preparation. They consider the main role of media as monitorial. In some cases, they cast doubt on journalists’ ability to evaluate athletic performance accurately, and they are also critical of errors in interviews, however they acknowledgethat there are good, and possibly excellent journalists as well.

The Prisoner's Dilemma Game and Cooperation in the Rat

1984 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 687-696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rick M. Gardner ◽  
Terry L. Corbin ◽  
Janelle S. Beltramo ◽  
Gary S. Nickell
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Visual Communication ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Human Subjects ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Cooperation in pairs of rats playing the prisoner's dilemma game was investigated. Six pairs of animals were taught to make either cooperative or uncooperative responses by running to one or the other end of a T-maze. Two T-mazes were joined together such that animals could respond simultaneously. Animals were run under conditions in which visual communication was present and absent. Mutually uncooperative responses were the most common and mutually cooperative behaviors the least preferred. Introduction of a barrier between the mazes, which removed visual communication between pairs, sharply accentuated uncooperative behavior. Similarities of the present findings to results with human subjects and the implications of using game theory for studying cooperative behavior in animals are discussed.

Stability Analysis of Supply Chain Cooperation Contract under Asymmetric Information

2010 ◽  
Vol 44-47 ◽  
pp. 794-798 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Ma
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Transition Period ◽  
Information Economics ◽  
Real Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
The Stability

The stability of cooperation contract is the result of abandon opportunistic behavior in the process of repeated games among the enterprise and the other subjects in the supply chain from long-term interests, and is also the foundation of healthy development for the whole supply chain. But in real life cooperation contract instability everywhere for a variety of reasons, such as ethical considerations, institutional factors, cultural factors and special reasons during the transition period and so on. From the perspective of information economics and game theory, the main game process of cooperation between enterprise and the other subjects in supply chain is not only the game of information, but also the game of interests. Information structure and the interesting structure are the important factors for the subjects of the game of the implementation of decisions and the basic contractual constraints for cooperative game equilibrium. Cooperation behaviors among the enterprise and the other subjects in the supply chain were studied on the basis of game theory, and the stability of cooperation contract is also being discussed in this paper.

scholarly journals Military Operations

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Harald Høiback
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Military Power ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Historical Method ◽  
Military Commanders ◽  
Operational Art ◽  
History Of ◽  
Systematic Thinking

AbstractMilitary operations can be a complex and cumbersome undertaking, involving millions of soldiers and tonnes of equipment. Even though war has been part of human experience for time immemorial, systematic thinking about how to prepare, conduct, and use military operations is nonetheless a rather new undertaking. This chapter explores the history of thinking about military operations, broadly defined, and narrows down on operations as the concept is used today.After the historical exploration, the chapter investigates how military operations can be studied. In principle, there are four different ways to approach operations as a field of study. The most common methods are the historical method and operations research, i.e., making heuristic models of reality. Game theory and axiomatic foundationalism are the other two but are far less used than the former two.The development of modern military thinking notwithstanding, it is still difficult to convert military power to strategic gains, and the latter part of the chapter explains why. Military commanders and planning groups do not always get the what and why from the political level, making it difficult to find the how. Military operations are also intrinsically difficult because your opponent will try to make it difficult for you. The concept of an operational level of command is also problematic, since it tends to do the opposite of what is intended. Instead of pulling tactics and strategy closer together, it tends to push them apart. And finally, the word “art” in “operational art” is perhaps also an unfortunate misnomer?

Bayesian Rationality and Social Epistemology

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Epistemic Game Theory ◽  
Famous Theorem ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Natural Equilibrium ◽  
Bayesian Rationality

This chapter uses epistemic game theory to expand on the notion of social norms as choreographer of a correlated equilibrium, and to elucidate the socio-psychological prerequisites for the notion that social norms implement correlated equilibria. The correlated equilibrium is a much more natural equilibrium criterion than the Nash equilibrium, because of a famous theorem of Aumann (1987), who showed that Bayesian rational agents in an epistemic game G with a common subjective prior play a correlated equilibrium of G. Thus, while rationality and common priors do not imply Nash equilibrium, these assumptions do imply correlated equilibrium and social norms act not only as choreographer, but also supply the epistemic conditions for common priors.

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