eCK Secure Single Round ID-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols with Master Perfect Forward Secrecy

Author(s):  
Tapas Pandit ◽  
Rana Barua ◽  
Somanath Tripathy
2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (7) ◽  
pp. 1108-1113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chun-Jie Cao ◽  
Chao Yang ◽  
Xing-Hua Li ◽  
Yuan Bo Guo ◽  
Jian Feng Ma

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 161
Author(s):  
S. Sathya ◽  
M. Ranjith Kumar ◽  
K. Madheswaran

The keyestablishment for secure many-to-many communications is very important nowadays. The problem is inspired by the proliferation of large-scale distributed file systems supporting parallel access to multiple storage devices. In this, a variety of authenticated key exchange protocols that are designed to address the issues. This shows that these protocols are capable of reducing the workload of the metadata server and concurrently supporting forward secrecy and escrow-freeness. All this requires only a small fraction of increased computation overhead at the client. This proposed three authenticated key exchange protocols for parallel network file system (pNFS). The protocols offer three appealing advantages over the existing Kerberos-based protocol. First, the metadata server executing these protocols has much lower workload than that of the Kerberos-based approach. Second, two of these protocols provide forward secrecy: one is partially forward secure (with respect to multiple sessions within a time period), while the other is fully forward secure (with respect to a session). Third, designed a protocol which not only provides forward secrecy, but is also escrow-free.


2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (06) ◽  
pp. 979-991 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHENG-CHI LEE ◽  
RUI-XIANG CHANG ◽  
HSIEN-JU KO

It is a crucial that password security be effective and constantly improved. The three-party encrypted key exchange (3PEKE) protocol has been used to protect passwords transmitted between users. Recently, Chang and Chang proposed a novel 3PEKE (ECC-3PEKE) protocol using a super-poly-to-one trapdoor function which demonstrates high efficiency. However, Chen et al. and Yoon et al., respectively, showed that the ECC-3PEKE protocol can not prevent undetectable on-line password guessing attacks and proposed improved protocols. Unfortunately, their improved protocols suffer from off-line password guessing attacks without perfect forward secrecy. Hence, the authors propose an improved protocol to strengthen their security.


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