In emerging technological world, security potentially remains as a highest challenge in the large-scale distributed systems, as it is suffering extensively with adversarial attacks due to insufficient mutual authentication. In order to address this, a state-of-art tetrahedron (3D) based two-server Password Authenticated and Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol has been formulated with formal proof of security by incorporating the elementary properties of plane geometry. The main intention of this work is, obtaining a password from the stored credentials must be infeasible when both the servers compromised together. At the outset to realize these goals, in this paper, the properties of the tetrahedron are utilized along with Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange algorithm to withstand against malicious attacks. A significant aspect of the proposed 3D PAKE protocol is, client side complexity has been reduced to a greater extent in terms of computation and communication. Both theoretically and practically, 3D PAKE protocol is the first demonstrable secure two-server PAKE protocol that breaks the assumptions of the Yang et al. and Yi et al. protocol that the two servers must not compromise together. Computational complexity, communication complexity, security key principles, best of all attacks happening dubiously are considered as the evaluation parameters to compare the performance of the proposed 3D PAKE protocol.
Towards modelling perfect forward secrecy in two-message authenticated key exchange under ephemeral-key revelation
