On Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Positional Games with Average Payoffs

2015 ◽  
pp. 171-186
Author(s):  
Dmitrii Lozovanu ◽  
Stefan Pickl
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Positional Games

Markov Decision Processes and Determining Nash Equilibria for Stochastic Positional Games

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 13398-13403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dmitrii Lozovanu ◽  
Stefan Pickl ◽  
Erik Kropat
Keyword(s):  
Markov Decision Processes ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Decision Processes ◽  
Positional Games ◽  
Markov Decision

A Theory of Patronized Goods: Inefficient and Efficient Equilibria

2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Equilibrium Conditions ◽  
Policy Issues

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.

Berge and Nash Equilibria in a Linear-Quadratic Differential Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 81 (11) ◽  
pp. 2108-2131
Author(s):  
V. I. Zhukovskiy ◽  
A. S. Gorbatov ◽  
K. N. Kudryavtsev
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Quadratic Differential ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Linear Quadratic

scholarly journals Expressiveness and Nash Equilibrium in Iterated Boolean Games

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Julian Gutierrez ◽  
Paul Harrenstein ◽  
Giuseppe Perelli ◽  
Michael Wooldridge
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Infinite Sequence ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Temporal Logics ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Temporal Properties ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Boolean Games

We define and investigate a novel notion of expressiveness for temporal logics that is based on game theoretic equilibria of multi-agent systems. We use iterated Boolean games as our abstract model of multi-agent systems [Gutierrez et al. 2013, 2015a]. In such a game, each agent  has a goal  , represented using (a fragment of) Linear Temporal Logic ( ) . The goal  captures agent  ’s preferences, in the sense that the models of  represent system behaviours that would satisfy  . Each player controls a subset of Boolean variables , and at each round in the game, player is at liberty to choose values for variables in any way that she sees fit. Play continues for an infinite sequence of rounds, and so as players act they collectively trace out a model for , which for every player will either satisfy or fail to satisfy their goal. Players are assumed to act strategically, taking into account the goals of other players, in an attempt to bring about computations satisfying their goal. In this setting, we apply the standard game-theoretic concept of (pure) Nash equilibria. The (possibly empty) set of Nash equilibria of an iterated Boolean game can be understood as inducing a set of computations, each computation representing one way the system could evolve if players chose strategies that together constitute a Nash equilibrium. Such a set of equilibrium computations expresses a temporal property—which may or may not be expressible within a particular fragment. The new notion of expressiveness that we formally define and investigate is then as follows: What temporal properties are characterised by the Nash equilibria of games in which agent goals are expressed in specific fragments of  ? We formally define and investigate this notion of expressiveness for a range of fragments. For example, a very natural question is the following: Suppose we have an iterated Boolean game in which every goal is represented using a particular fragment of : is it then always the case that the equilibria of the game can be characterised within ? We show that this is not true in general.

Toward Refined Nash Equilibria for the SET K-COVER Problem via a Memorial Mixed-Response Algorithm

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Changhao Sun ◽  
Xiaochu Wang ◽  
Huaxin Qiu ◽  
Wei Sun ◽  
Qingrui Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Mixed Response ◽  
Cover Problem
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