Mixed Fuzzy-Logic and Game-Theoretical Approach to Justify Vehicle Models for Servicing the Public Bus Line

One of the main problems to be solved by the transport operators is the substantiation of the vehicle models servicing the transport lines. A gametheoretical approach is proposed in this paper to justify the bus model choice based on the passengers’ preferences and the structure of the passenger flows. To estimate the customers’ preferences, the membership functions for fuzzy sets of the optimal vehicle models were defined. The simulation experiment aiming to estimate the city fleet structure in terms of the vehicles’ capacity was conducted for the Talas city (Kazakhstan) based on the proposed approach with use of the corresponding software implementation of the developed mathematical models. As a result of the experimental studies, the impact of the passengers’ flow structure and the number of carriers on the rational structure of the city bus fleet was studied in the paper.

Video Platforms’ Value-Added Service Investments and Pricing Strategies for Advertisers

Using a game-theoretical approach, this paper develops a duopoly model and examines value-added service (VAS) investments and pricing strategies on video platforms with opposite inter-group network externalities between two groups. We consider two scenarios with VAS investment, namely, a single platform investing in VASs for advertisers (S-Model) and both platforms investing in VASs for advertisers (B-Model). We found the following: (i) In the S-Model, the investing platform’s VAS level remains maximum when the marginal investing cost is low; otherwise, it decreases with the cost. Investing and non-investing platforms’ advertising prices are unaffected by the marginal investing cost if the cost is low; otherwise, the prices decrease and increase with the cost, respectively. Furthermore, the investing platform’s advertising price is higher than the non-investing platform’s. (ii) In the B-Model, the two platforms’ VAS levels remain maximum if the marginal investing cost is low; otherwise, they decrease with the cost. The two platforms’ advertising prices are equal and irrelevant to the marginal investing cost. (iii) The investing platform’s VAS level in the S-Model is higher than or the same as that in the B-Model and the investing platform’s advertising price in the S-Model is higher than that in the B-Model. (iv) Compared to the scenario without VAS investment, the investing platform’s advertising price is higher in the S-Model, but the same in the B-Model.

Game-theoretical approach to payoff distribution in joint construction of transportation and engineering networks

The article discusses a game-theoretical approach to payoff distribution between the construction participants during the transport and engineering networks construction. The construction participants can be both the owners of land plots or buildings, and the administrative personnel of settlements and states. It is shown that payoff distribution between the participants should satisfy two principles: dominance and fairness. To determine fair payoff, the mathematical apparatus of cooperative games is used and the Shapley vector is calculated. Options for the implementation of a construction project for 4 and 8 participants are being considered. The use of the Lutsenko formula, which greatly simplifies the calculation of the Shapley vector components for the considered problem of transport and engineering networks construction, is discussed.

Managing Financial Risks while Performing International Commercial Transactions. Intertemporal Lessons from Athens in Classical Times

In this paper, we mainly focus on two institutional aspects that are related to financial risk, that is, profiteering and the use of non-fraudulent coins when performing financial transactions. We argue that these two prerequisites were important for the success of the commercially oriented economy of the Athenian state in comparison with its allies in the East Mediterranean during the classical period. In particular, we briefly explain the structure of the Athenian economy, and then we focus on the agoranomoi and the dokimastai, the two main financial institutions related to (i) measures against profiteering and (ii) ensuring the purity of the currency when performing commercial transactions. Then, following a game theoretical approach, we provide a fictional example as to how the two institutions functioned in practice. Our findings confirm that these institutions were crucial in reducing financial risk when performing international commercial transactions, since they provided symmetrical information on the quality and purity of the currencies circulating in the Athenian economy. In the case of the Athenian state, we further convey that measures against profiteering and the use of unadulterated currency comprise intertemporal axioms, in the sense that their importance is not merely a phenomenon of modern times, but rather, on the contrary, one that dates back to much earlier times.

A New Edge Betweenness Measure Using a Game Theoretical Approach: An Application to Hierarchical Community Detection

In this paper we formally define the hierarchical clustering network problem (HCNP) as the problem to find a good hierarchical partition of a network. This new problem focuses on the dynamic process of the clustering rather than on the final picture of the clustering process. To address it, we introduce a new hierarchical clustering algorithm in networks, based on a new shortest path betweenness measure. To calculate it, the communication between each pair of nodes is weighed by the importance of the nodes that establish this communication. The weights or importance associated to each pair of nodes are calculated as the Shapley value of a game, named as the linear modularity game. This new measure, (the node-game shortest path betweenness measure), is used to obtain a hierarchical partition of the network by eliminating the link with the highest value. To evaluate the performance of our algorithm, we introduce several criteria that allow us to compare different dendrograms of a network from two point of view: modularity and homogeneity. Finally, we propose a faster algorithm based on a simplification of the node-game shortest path betweenness measure, whose order is quadratic on sparse networks. This fast version is competitive from a computational point of view with other hierarchical fast algorithms, and, in general, it provides better results.