How Infallible but Corrigible Full Belief Is Possible

2016 ◽  
pp. 247-267
Author(s):  
Isaac Levi
Keyword(s):  
Full Belief

Open-Mindedness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Fantl
Keyword(s):  
Affective Factors ◽  
Significant Time ◽  
Full Belief

This chapter argues for a “Platonic” conception of open-mindedness. Open-mindedness is not simply a matter of being willing to change your mind in response to a counterargument. You have to be willing to change your mind conditional on spending significant time with the argument, finding each step compelling, and being unable to expose a flaw. If you are willing to do this, then you may be open-minded toward the argument provided you also don’t violate various procedural norms and aren’t disposed to allow various affective factors to influence your beliefs (for example, you aren’t willfully ignorant). On this conception, we can explain how it is possible to hold an outright or “full” belief even while being open-minded toward arguments against that belief.

scholarly journals JAMESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY FORMALISED: AN EXPLICATION OF ‘THE WILL TO BELIEVE’

Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Pettigrew
Keyword(s):  
Utility Theory ◽  
William James ◽  
Epistemic Utility ◽  
Full Belief ◽  
The Will ◽  
Suspension Of Judgment ◽  
Doxastic States

ABSTRACTFamously, William James held that there are two commandments that govern our epistemic life: Believe truth! Shun error! In this paper, I give a formal account of James' claim using the tools of epistemic utility theory. I begin by giving the account for categorical doxastic states – that is, full belief, full disbelief, and suspension of judgment. Then I will show how the account plays out for graded doxastic states – that is, credences. The latter part of the paper thus answers a question left open in Pettigrew (2014).

scholarly journals In Defence of Anthropomorphic Theism

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-122
Author(s):  
Peter Forrest
Keyword(s):  
Full Belief ◽  
Simplicity Of God

I reply to seven objections to anthropomorphic theism: (1) That anthropomorphic theism is idolatrous. In reply I rely on the concept/conception distinction. (2) That faith requires certainty. In reply I argue that full belief may be based on probable inference. (3) That the truly infinite is incomprehensible. In reply I distinguish two senses of knowing what you mean. (4) ‘You Kant say that!’ In reply I distinguish shallow from deep Kantianism. (5) ‘Shall Old Aquinas be forgot?’ In reply I discuss the simplicity of God. (6) What those garrulous mystics say about the ineffable. In reply I argue that mystics should be anthropomorphites. (7) Anti-theodicy. In reply I distinguish the community of all agents from the community of finite frail agents. 

Full Belief and Loose Speech

2019 ◽  
Vol 128 (3) ◽  
pp. 255-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Moss
Keyword(s):  
Rational Beliefs ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Full Belief ◽  
The Preface Paradox ◽  
Probabilistic Theories ◽  
The Way

This paper defends an account of full belief, including an account of its relationship to credence. Along the way, I address several familiar and difficult questions about belief. Does fully believing a proposition require having maximal confidence in it? Are rational beliefs closed under entailment, or does the preface paradox show that rational agents can believe inconsistent propositions? Does whether you believe a proposition depend partly on your practical interests? My account of belief resolves the tension between conflicting answers to these questions that have been defended in the literature. In addition, my account complements fruitful probabilistic theories of assertion and knowledge.

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