A review on phytochemical and pharmacological activities of some ethnomedical plants used by tribal and folk peoples of AndhraPradesh in animal health care

Folk people are the main natives of the countryside and forests. They are always being much closed to nature. They are fully dependent on their surroundings for their basic needs. Even during diseased conditions, they mainly rely on the use of traditional medicines available in their surroundings. They believe in trees as God and use their products for their wellbeing. They have full belief in nature and their belongings. They utilized locally available plants and other natural materials for the treatment of several diseases. But this knowledge of traditional medicines is found to be confined only up to tribes and folk people of the society. Thus, it is required that such useful knowledge about indigenous medicines should be documented, popularized, and systematized for the welfare of human society. The present paper is an effort to reveal the importance of ethno medicines for tribes as well as the whole society.

Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance

In this paper, we propose a new theory of rationality defeat. We propose that defeaters are indicators of ignorance, evidence that we’re not in a position to know some target proposition. When the evidence that we’re not in a position to know is sufficiently strong and the probability that we can know is too low, it is not rational to believe. We think that this account retains all the virtues of the more familiar approaches that characterize defeat in terms of its connection to reasons to believe or to confirmation but provides a better approach to higher-order defeat. We also think that a strength of this proposal is that it can be embedded into a larger normative framework. On our account the no-defeater condition is redundant. We can extract our theory of defeat from our theory of what makes it rational to believe—it is rational to believe when it is sufficiently probable that our belief would be knowledge. Thus, our view can provide a monistic account of defeat, one that gives a unifying explanation of the toxicity of different defeaters that is grounded in a framework that either recognizes knowledge as the norm of belief or identifies knowledge as the fundamental epistemic good that full belief can realize.

Full Belief and Loose Speech

This paper defends an account of full belief, including an account of its relationship to credence. Along the way, I address several familiar and difficult questions about belief. Does fully believing a proposition require having maximal confidence in it? Are rational beliefs closed under entailment, or does the preface paradox show that rational agents can believe inconsistent propositions? Does whether you believe a proposition depend partly on your practical interests? My account of belief resolves the tension between conflicting answers to these questions that have been defended in the literature. In addition, my account complements fruitful probabilistic theories of assertion and knowledge.

Open-Mindedness

This chapter argues for a “Platonic” conception of open-mindedness. Open-mindedness is not simply a matter of being willing to change your mind in response to a counterargument. You have to be willing to change your mind conditional on spending significant time with the argument, finding each step compelling, and being unable to expose a flaw. If you are willing to do this, then you may be open-minded toward the argument provided you also don’t violate various procedural norms and aren’t disposed to allow various affective factors to influence your beliefs (for example, you aren’t willfully ignorant). On this conception, we can explain how it is possible to hold an outright or “full” belief even while being open-minded toward arguments against that belief.

Epistemic modals and probability operators

This chapter defends a semantics for epistemic modals and probability operators. This semantics is probabilistic—that is, sentences containing these expressions have sets of probability spaces as their semantic values relative to a context. Existing non-truth-conditional semantic theories of epistemic modals face serious problems when it comes to interpreting nested modal constructions such as ‘it must be possible that Jones smokes’. The semantics in this chapter solves these problems, accounting for several significant features of nested epistemic vocabulary. The chapter ends by defending a probabilistic semantics for simple sentences that do not contain any epistemic vocabulary, and by using this semantics to illuminate the relationship between credence and full belief.

JAMESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY FORMALISED: AN EXPLICATION OF ‘THE WILL TO BELIEVE’

ABSTRACTFamously, William James held that there are two commandments that govern our epistemic life: Believe truth! Shun error! In this paper, I give a formal account of James' claim using the tools of epistemic utility theory. I begin by giving the account for categorical doxastic states – that is, full belief, full disbelief, and suspension of judgment. Then I will show how the account plays out for graded doxastic states – that is, credences. The latter part of the paper thus answers a question left open in Pettigrew (2014).