rational beliefs
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Author(s):  
Michael LeBuffe
Keyword(s):  

In Spinoza's view, the highest purpose of society is to make each human being in it as well off as possible. He takes wellbeing to consist in knowledge, and the freedom from irrational, highly passionate ideas. On Spinoza's conception of religion, many citizens in any given society are motivated primarily by highly irrational, highly passionate religious ideas. Here I argue that Spinoza's psychology suggests that there are two possible ways to overcome such ideas. Society might work to eliminate religious ideas in citizens, thereby relieving them of their most irrational and harmful beliefs; or society might work to give citizens different, highly rational beliefs while leaving religion untouched. I argue that, given Spinoza's other commitments, only the second method could work. 


Author(s):  
Christian Dahlman ◽  
Alex Stein ◽  
Giovanni Tuzet

Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law presents a cross-disciplinary overview of the core issues in the theory and methodology of adjudicative evidence and factfinding, assembling the major philosophical and interdisciplinary insights that define evidence theory, as related to law, in a single book. The volume presents contemporary debates on truth, knowledge, rational beliefs, proof, argumentation, explanation, coherence, probability, economics, psychology, bias, gender, and race. It covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory, and inference to the best explanation. The volume’s contributions come from scholars spread across three continents and twelve different countries, whose common interest is evidence theory as related to law.


Author(s):  
Daniel Greco

How should we form beliefs concerning global climate change? For most of us, directly evaluating the evidence isn’t feasible; we lack expertise. So, any rational beliefs we form will have to be based in part on deference to those who have it. But in this domain, questions about how to identify experts can be fraught. This chapter discusses a partial answer to the question of how we in fact identify experts: Dan Kahan’s cultural cognition thesis, according to which we treat experts on factual questions of political import only insofar as they share our moral and cultural values. The chapter then poses some normative questions about cultural cognition: is it a species of irrationality that must be overcome if we are to communicate scientific results effectively, or is it instead an inescapable part of rational belief management? Ultimately, it is argued that cultural cognition is substantively unreasonable, though not formally irrational.


Author(s):  
Qingyuan Du ◽  
Stefano Eusepi ◽  
Bruce Preston

Author(s):  
Raymond DiGiuseppe ◽  
Bernard Gorman ◽  
Joanne Raptis ◽  
Alina Agiurgioaei-Boie ◽  
Fabian Agiurgioaei ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 219-238
Author(s):  
Irena Stojković ◽  
Tatjana Vukosavljević-Gvozden

Introduction. The use of online social networks has become widespread among the young. Although it may have beneficial effects, it has been established that some people develop problematic or excessive use of social networks which may negatively impact their psychosocial functioning. Objective. The aim of the present study was to investigate social networks use among emerging adults and to explore whether irrational and rational beliefs as conceptualized within the Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy (RE&CBT) framework predict problematic social networks use. Following RE&CBT framework, we hypothesized that irrational beliefs are positively, and rational beliefs negatively related to problematic social networks use. Methods. The sample included 210 emerging adults (age range 18-26, M = 21.08, SD = 2.02), 59.0% females. Serbian version of the General Attitude and Belief Scale (SGABS) was used for the assessment of irrational and rational beliefs. Serbian version of Internet Addiction Test was adapted for the assessment of problematic social networks use. Results. The results supported the hypothesis that irrational beliefs are positively related to problematic social networks use. When controlling for intercorrelations between beliefs, demands for love and approval from others stood out as a single significant predictor of problematic social networks use. Rational beliefs were unrelated to problematic social networks use, thus not supporting the hypothesis. Conclusion. The results suggest that RE&CBT approach, which has been proven to be efficacious in prevention of various problems of psychosocial functioning may also provide framework for supporting young people to use social networks in a constructive way.


2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 2156759X2098583
Author(s):  
Jeffrey M. Warren ◽  
Leslie A. Locklear

We collected data on parental involvement from 101 American Indian parents in the Southeastern United States with children enrolled in kindergarten–12th grade. We analyzed the data using Pearson product–moment correlation coefficients and multiple regression modeling. Findings suggested that parental involvement is related to student achievement. Rational beliefs accounted for a significant amount of variance explained in authoritative parenting. School counselors familiar with the impact of parenting on student achievement are best positioned to support the success of American Indian students.


Mind ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Weston Siscoe

Abstract It is clear that beliefs can be assessed both as to their justification and as to their rationality. What is not as clear, however, is how the rationality and justification of belief relate to one another. Stewart Cohen has stumped for the popular proposal that rationality and justification come to the same thing, that rational beliefs just are justified beliefs, supporting his view by arguing that ‘justified belief’ and ‘rational belief’ are synonymous. In this paper, I will give reason to think that Cohen’s argument is spurious. I will show that ‘rational’ and ‘justified’ occupy two distinct semantic categories—‘rational’ is an absolute gradable adjective and ‘justified’ is a relative gradable adjective—telling against the thought that ‘rational belief’ and ‘justified belief’ are synonymous. I will then argue that the burden of proof is on those who would equate rationality and justification, making the case that those who hold this prominent position face the difficulty of explaining how rationality and justification come to the same thing even though ‘rational’ and ‘justified’ are not synonymous.


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