On Strong Equilibria and Improvement Dynamics in Network Creation Games

This chapter compares majority judgment mechanism to other methods, including first-past-the-post and Borda’s method, among others, in the context of the game of voting. The concept of utilities, which depends on grade distribution of the electorate, is extended to election output. When the identity of the election winner is dependent on the utilities of voters, Condorcet-winner is elected by a large number of strong-equilibria strategy-profiles. The chapter explores best-response correspondence, according to which, if the number of possible equilibria is very small and sometimes unique, the Condorcet-winner emerges as the unique, possible equilibrium outcome and honest votes determine the election outcome.

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NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies

Theory and Decision ◽

10.1007/s11238-019-09701-y ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 87 (2) ◽

pp. 155-170

Author(s):

Zhe Yang ◽

Haiqun Zhang

Keyword(s):

Population Games ◽

Strong Equilibria ◽

Pure Strategies

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Bounded-Distance Network Creation Games

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation ◽

10.1145/2770639 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 3 (3) ◽

pp. 1-20 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Davide Bilò ◽

Luciano Gualà ◽

Guido Proietti

Keyword(s):

Bounded Distance ◽

Network Creation Games

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Flow-Based Network Creation Games

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence ◽

10.24963/ijcai.2020/20 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Hagen Echzell ◽

Tobias Friedrich ◽

Pascal Lenzner ◽

Anna Melnichenko

Keyword(s):

Communication Networks ◽

Network Flow ◽

Price Of Anarchy ◽

Simple Algorithm ◽

Past Research ◽

Price Of Stability ◽

Central Position ◽

Network Nodes ◽

Strategic Agents ◽

Network Creation Games

Network Creation Games(NCGs) model the creation of decentralized communication networks like the Internet. In such games strategic agents corresponding to network nodes selfishly decide with whom to connect to optimize some objective function. Past research intensively analyzed models where the agents strive for a central position in the network. This models agents optimizing the network for low-latency applications like VoIP. However, with today's abundance of streaming services it is important to ensure that the created network can satisfy the increased bandwidth demand. To the best of our knowledge, this natural problem of the decentralized strategic creation of networks with sufficient bandwidth has not yet been studied. We introduce Flow-Based NCGs where the selfish agents focus on bandwidth instead of latency. In essence, budget-constrained agents create network links to maximize their minimum or average network flow value to all other network nodes. Equivalently, this can also be understood as agents who create links to increase their connectivity and thus also the robustness of the network. For this novel type of NCG we prove that pure Nash equilibria exist, we give a simple algorithm for computing optimal networks, we show that the Price of Stability is 1 and we prove an (almost) tight bound of 2 on the Price of Anarchy. Last but not least, we show that our models do not admit a potential function.

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