Improved Key Recovery Attacks on Reduced-Round AES with Practical Data and Memory Complexities

2018 ◽  
pp. 185-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Achiya Bar-On ◽  
Orr Dunkelman ◽  
Nathan Keller ◽  
Eyal Ronen ◽  
Adi Shamir
Keyword(s):  
Key Recovery ◽  
Key Recovery Attacks

scholarly journals Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis with key difference invariant bias for block ciphers

Cybersecurity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenqin Cao ◽  
Wentao Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Time Complexity ◽  
Block Ciphers ◽  
Linear Cryptanalysis ◽  
Compression Technique ◽  
Key Recovery ◽  
Linear Approximations ◽  
Theoretical Advantage ◽  
Multidimensional Linear ◽  
Multidimensional Linear Cryptanalysis ◽  
Key Recovery Attacks

AbstractFor block ciphers, Bogdanov et al. found that there are some linear approximations satisfying that their biases are deterministically invariant under key difference. This property is called key difference invariant bias. Based on this property, Bogdanov et al. proposed a related-key statistical distinguisher and turned it into key-recovery attacks on LBlock and TWINE-128. In this paper, we propose a new related-key model by combining multidimensional linear cryptanalysis with key difference invariant bias. The main theoretical advantage is that our new model does not depend on statistical independence of linear approximations. We demonstrate our cryptanalysis technique by performing key recovery attacks on LBlock and TWINE-128. By using the relations of the involved round keys to reduce the number of guessed subkey bits. Moreover, the partial-compression technique is used to reduce the time complexity. We can recover the master key of LBlock up to 25 rounds with about 260.4 distinct known plaintexts, 278.85 time complexity and 261 bytes of memory requirements. Our attack can recover the master key of TWINE-128 up to 28 rounds with about 261.5 distinct known plaintexts, 2126.15 time complexity and 261 bytes of memory requirements. The results are the currently best ones on cryptanalysis of LBlock and TWINE-128.

scholarly journals Full Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC/NMAC-MD4 and NMAC-MD5

2007 ◽  
pp. 13-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre-Alain Fouque ◽  
Gaëtan Leurent ◽  
Phong Q. Nguyen
Keyword(s):  
Key Recovery ◽  
Key Recovery Attacks

scholarly journals Low-Complexity Key Recovery Attacks on GOST Block Cipher

Cryptologia ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas T. Courtois
Keyword(s):  
Block Cipher ◽  
Low Complexity ◽  
Key Recovery ◽  
Key Recovery Attacks

scholarly journals A key exchange protocol relying on polynomial maps

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (01) ◽  
pp. 1950003
Author(s):  
Koichiro Akiyama ◽  
Shuhei Nakamura ◽  
Masaru Ito ◽  
Noriko Hirata-Kohno
Keyword(s):  
Key Exchange ◽  
System Of Equations ◽  
Polynomial Equations ◽  
Key Exchange Protocol ◽  
Multivariate Polynomial ◽  
Key Recovery ◽  
Polynomial Maps ◽  
Key Recovery Attacks

In this paper, we propose a key exchange protocol using multivariate polynomial maps whose security relies on the hardness in finding a solution to a certain system of nonlinear polynomial equations. Under the hardness assumption of solving the system of equations, we prove that our protocol is secure against key recovery attacks by passive attackers if the protocol is established honestly.

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