The Nexus of Managerial Imperfect Duty and Its Conceptual Advantages

2018 ◽  
pp. 39-64
Author(s):  
Richard M. Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Duty

Imperfect Duty: Lawyers’ Obligation to Foster Access to Justice

2008 ◽  
pp. 107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alice Woolley
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Policy Response ◽  
Access To Justice ◽  
Legal Services ◽  
Imperfect Duty ◽  
Special Obligation ◽  
Legal Market ◽  
Integral Component

Access to justice is an integral component of the legal system. However, the question of upon whose shoulders the obligation of ensuring this access should fall has been widely debated. In particular, do lawyers, as part ofthe legalprofession, have a special obligation to foster access to justice? In this article, the author explores the legitimacy of various arguments with respect to whether lawyers should carry this obligation to a greater extent than other members of society. The author begins by critiquing the traditional arguments related to imposing such an obligation on lawyers — for instance, the refined monopoly arguments. She then goes on to critically consider an alternative argument: that imperfections in the marketfor legal services justify the existence of a special obligation for lawyers. An examination of the limitations of this justification follows. Overall, the author concludes that while the arguments arising from imperfections in the legal market offer the best justification for seeing lawyers have a special obligation to ensure access tojustice, the claims from the argument are modest ones, and any policy response in furtherance of such an obligation should be similarly modest.

Noncompliers’ Duties

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anja Karnein
Keyword(s):  
Climate Justice ◽  
Imperfect Duty ◽  
Moral Agents

This chapter examines in what sorts of situation noncompliers, of which there are many in the climate justice context, can be thought to have duties—apart from the duty to comply—and how these duties ought best be described. It problematizes the unclear status of a duty that tells an agent what to do in cases where she is not doing what she ought to and reviews four possible ways to circumvent this “status problem” when explaining the presence of duties for noncompliers. Only one of these positions can show that noncompliers have duties because they failed to comply and not simply because they are moral agents. This position considers all duties to be accompanied by the imperfect duty of beneficence. When the former are not complied with, the latter remains but changes in significance. It is this position, or so this chapter maintains, that most plausibly captures our intuitions.

Humanitarian Intervention as a Duty

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kok-Chor Tan
Keyword(s):  
Humanitarian Intervention ◽  
The Other ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Imperfect Duty ◽  
Humanitarian Emergencies ◽  
Personal Cost

Assuming an international commitment to intervene in severe and urgent humanitarian emergencies, as expressed by the doctrine ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, I discuss two objections that the duty to intervene is nonetheless a duty that is easily limited by other moral considerations. One objection is that this duty will exceed the reasonable limits of any obligation given the high personal cost of intervention. The other objection is that any duty to intervene will be an imperfect duty, and therefore not a duty that is ascribed to and demandable of any specific actor. I will argue that these objections do not undermine the principle of the responsibility to protect.

KANT ON IMPERFECT DUTY AND SUPEREROGATION

Kant-Studien ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 62 (1-4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Jr. Hill
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Duty

scholarly journals The paradox of imperfect duty in Kant's moral philosophy: A problem in 'applying' ethics'

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 540-564
Author(s):  
Phillip Richter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Applied Ethics ◽  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Imperfect Duty ◽  
Helping Others ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals

The Applied Ethics debate has not yet sufficiently clarified what application of ethics exactly is. The issue of application is considered to be especially problematic in Kantian ethics or in discourse ethics. This article describes the concept of applying ethics in Kant. In discussing the duty of helping others and the theory of its application in Metaphysics of Morals it is shown that a strict separation of justification and application in ethical theory results in the paradox of imperfect duty. The paradox says that the duty to help others would be fulfilled without ever being fulfilled in action. To overcome the paradox it is necessary to form submaximes of helping, which are not arbitrarily but instructed by a theory of casuistry. This casuistry, if it is considered as a doctrine of application in Kantian ethics, can overcome the paradox of imperfect duty. However, the casuistry can overcome this paradox only if it is understood as a philosophy of prudence, which can be found in Aristotle or Descartes.

The (Not So) Imperfect Duty of Beneficence

1996 ◽  
pp. 105-122
Author(s):  
David Cummiskey
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Duty

Due Care

2021 ◽  
pp. 50-70
Author(s):  
Barbara Herman
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Imperfect Duty ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Moral Motive

This chapter explores the imperfect duty of non-negligence or due care. It is a complex secondary duty that regulates the performance of primary duties. Its norms of attention and execution are responsive to a primary duty’s interpreted value. Due care often requires motivational capacities that track moral value across complex circumstances of action—a claim inconsistent with a dictum that duties cannot impose requirements that depend on motive. Middle Work 3 argues that the dictum depends on a rejectable view of motive, one modeled on a modular account of simple desires. The idea of a system motive is introduced as an affective organization that make an agent responsive to a region of value. This makes a moral motive an agential response to moral value and moral agency a motive-involved competence. We can then have a motive-involved duty without having a duty to have a motive.

Intentionality Attributions About Perfect and Imperfect Duty Violations

2010 ◽  
Vol 150 (2) ◽  
pp. 198-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jamie S. Hughes ◽  
David Trafimow
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Duty

Kantian Beneficence and the Problem of Obligatory Aid

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Stohr
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Imperfect Duty ◽  
Important Concern

AbstractCommon sense tells us that in certain circumstances, helping someone is morally obligatory. That intuition appears incompatible with Kant's account of beneficence as a wide imperfect duty, and its implication that agents may exercise latitude over which beneficent actions to perform. In this paper, I offer a resolution to the problem from which it follows that some opportunities to help admit latitude and others do not. I argue that beneficence has two components: the familiar wide duty to help others achieve their ends and a narrow duty to avoid indifference to others as end-setters. Although we are not always required to help, we are always required not to be indifferent. When helping someone is the only way not to be indifferent to a person, helping him/her is obligatory. My account avoids certain difficulties with other proposed solutions and can also address an important concern about proximity.

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