Measuring Impartial Beneficence: A Kantian Perspective on the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale

To capture genuine utilitarian tendencies, (Kahane et al., Psychological Review 125:131, 2018) developed the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS) based on two subscales, which measure the commitment to impartial beneficence and the willingness to cause harm for the greater good. In this article, I argue that the impartial beneficence subscale, which breaks ground with previous research on utilitarian moral psychology, does not distinctively measure utilitarian moral judgment. I argue that Kantian ethics captures the all-encompassing impartial concern for the well-being of all human beings. The Oxford Utilitarianism Scale draws, in fact, a point of division that places Kantian and utilitarian theories on the same track. I suggest that the impartial beneficence subscale needs to be significantly revised in order to capture distinctively utilitarian judgments. Additionally, I propose that psychological research should focus on exploring multiple sources of the phenomenon of impartial beneficence without categorizing it as exclusively utilitarian.

ETHICS OF KANT AND THE HERESY OF HUMAN WORSHIP.

The article examines Kant's understanding of ethics and the origin of his categories of morality. Particular attention is paid to the category of disgust, which is a kind of exception in Kantian ethics, since it is in no way derived from reason and the transcendental unity of apperception. Here Kant refers to feelings, and in general to some kind of irrational categories. The irrational category of disgust is used by Kant in those places where he argues the prohibition of suicide and the prohibition of such acts, which he characterized as “crimina carnis contra naturam”. Kant calls the prohibition of suicide the first ethical prohibition on which all obligations to oneself are based. Hence, it can be assumed that the rational Kantian ethics stands on a rather irrational foundation, which is the category of disgust. The prohibition of suicide is a basic Christian prohibition, Augustine calls it the most serious sin, since repentance is physically impossible here. It can be assumed that Kant in this case proceeds from such a dogmatic premise. But Kant himself argues this prohibition differently, pointing out that disgust is a distinguishing feature of man from other animals, therefore, the prohibition of suicide is a sign of man's dominance over other animals. This is more reminiscent of not canonical Christianity, but the old heresy of human worship, forbidden in the 4th century, in which opponents often accuse Protestant theologians

The Ethics of Human–Robot Interaction and Traditional Moral Theories

The rapid introduction of different kinds of robots and other machines with artificial intelligence into different domains of life raises the question of whether robots can be moral agents and moral patients. In other words, can robots perform moral actions? Can robots be on the receiving end of moral actions? To explore these questions, this chapter relates the new area of the ethics of human–robot interaction to traditional ethical theories such as utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and virtue ethics. These theories were developed with the assumption that the paradigmatic examples of moral agents and moral patients are human beings. As this chapter argues, this creates challenges for anybody who wishes to extend the traditional ethical theories to new questions of whether robots can be moral agents and/or moral patients.

Ricoeur and Cheng’s Parallel Reconciliations of the Right and the Good

Drawing on Paul Ricoeur’s “little ethics” and Chung-ying Cheng’s work on Confucian and Kantian ethics, this essay reinforces the broad outlines of a cross- cultural framework for reconciling conflicts between the good and the right, teleology and deontology, and perfectionism and liberalism so that we can recognize dynamic concerns across the grand sweep of moral life. Ricoeur and Cheng describe roughly parallel sets of relations and highlight similar dynamics among three planes of ethical life.

Kantian Ethics and Utopian Thinking

Is Kantian ethics guilty of utopian thinking? Good and bad uses of utopian ideals are distinguished, an apparent path is traced from Rousseau’s unworkable political ideal to Kant’s ethical ideal, and three versions of Kant’s Categorical Imperative (and counterparts in common moral discourse) are examined briefly with special attention on the kingdom of ends formulation. Following summary of previous development of this central idea, several objections suggesting that this idea encourages bad utopian thinking are briefly addressed: that we cannot count on everyone to follow ideal rules, that even conscientious people disagree in their moral judgments, and that theories that allow exceptions to familiar moral rules create a “slippery slope” to consequentialism.

Beyond Duty

This is a collection of essays on Kantian moral theory and practical ethics with the aim of developing Kantian ethics and making it accessible and relevant to contemporary problems. With a new emphasis on ideals beyond the strictest requirements of moral duty, the book expands the core aspects of Kantian ethics and offers a broader perspective on familiar moral problems. Some essays explain Kantian concepts, others review work of leading contemporary philosophers, and still others raise challenging ethical questions for more general audiences. Having previously written on finding value in nature, Hill develops an ethical ideal of appreciation of people and their lives, distinguishing this from both respect and beneficence. Hill argues that this has important implications about how we should think about close personal relationships, such as friendships, families, and relationships with people with disabilities. The first part focuses on Kantian moral theory. Topics include the structure of Kant’s argument in the Groundwork, his idea of imperfect duties to oneself, autonomy, and human dignity. Rawls’ constructivism is defended against O’Neill’s objections, and Kantian ethics defended against the charge of utopian thinking. The second part focuses on practical ethics. Topics include the ethics of suicide, philanthropy, conscientious objection, and tragic choices when it seems that every alternative offends against human dignity. An essay on moral education contrasts Kantian and Rawlsian perspectives. Another essay traces the role of self-respect in Rawls’ theory of justice and contrasts a Kantian conception. Two final essays develop and illustrate the ideal of appreciation.

Human Dignity and Tragic Choices

This essay comments on the aspirations and limits of normative ethical theory, some merits of a broadly Kantian version, the common complaint that Kantian ethics refuses to admit exceptions to familiar moral principles, objections to the idea of human dignity, examples of lies and torture, and the value of details and simplicity in ethics.

Kantian Moral Agency and the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence

This paper discusses the philosophical issues pertaining to Kantian moral agency and artificial intelligence (AI). Here, our objective is to offer a comprehensive analysis of Kantian ethics to elucidate the non-feasibility of Kantian machines. Meanwhile, the possibility of Kantian machines seems to contend with the genuine human Kantian agency. We argue that in machine morality, ‘duty’ should be performed with ‘freedom of will’ and ‘happiness’ because Kant narrated the human tendency of evaluating our ‘natural necessity’ through ‘happiness’ as the end. Lastly, we argue that the Kantian ‘freedom of will’ and ‘faculty of choice’ do not belong to any deterministic model of ‘agency’ as these are sacrosanct systems. The conclusion narrates the non-feasibility of Kantian AI agents from the genuine Kantian ethical outset, offering a utility-based Kantian ethical performer instead.

(Re)Defining Fairy Tales: A Deontology Ethical Approach to Oscar Wilde’s Selected Fairy Tales

Fairy tales are often used by authors to impart their moral values and principles. This is commonly done through the portrayal of their main characters, including their personalities, actions, and the consequences of their actions. In some cases, authors use death as a moral lesson due to its connotation as a form of punishment for a character’s misdeed. However, Oscar Wilde’s fairy tales contradict the conventional aspect of death in classic fairy tales. His main characters experienced death or physical disfigurement in the end despite their actions which readers would perceive as good or morally permissible. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the theme of morality in Wilde’s selected fairy tales through a Deontology Ethical approach. This study addressed the relationship between the personalities and actions of Wilde’s selected characters, as well as the consequences of their actions. Furthermore, using Kantian Ethics, the study evaluated the moral permissibility of the characters’ maxims underlying their actions. The findings showed that the personalities of Wilde’s characters could be categorised into those who adhere to or oppose Kant’s definition of personality based on their actions. The study also highlighted the varying deaths that Wilde’s characters faced in the end. Additionally, the analysis suggests that the reasons behind the actions of Wilde’s characters could be categorised into “for duty” and “for other means”. At the end of this study, readers would be introduced to a different moral theory in understanding a character without justifying it based on the simple “right versus wrong” principle.