The Groundwork

This essay notes background in Kant’s first Critique, reviews the aims and arguments of his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals section by section, and calls attention to several remaining questions and controversies. The Preface states the overall aim to identify the supreme principle of morality and to defend its claim to be rationally necessary. Section one uses common moral thought about duty and moral worth to identify the basic principle of a good will. Section two argues from the common idea of duty that this same principle is the supreme moral principle, that its requirements are expressed in several formulations, that this is the only possible Categorical Imperative, and that it presupposes that moral agents have autonomy of the will. The third section argues from a practical standpoint that we must take ourselves to be rational agents with autonomy of the will and therefore subject to the Categorical Imperative.

Kant on Punishment and Criminal Law – nine Theses

Kant is generally regarded as a representative of the theory of retaliation. This position is accused as scientific untenable. Supposedly, the idea of retaliation disregards all social purposes and demands punishment even where it was not necessary for the protection of legal interests. Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals of 1797 contains an already quite sophisticated criminal theory of timeless quality. In order to elaborate on them, however, one must not, as is customary, pick out a few passages, but one must take note of the “whole” doctrine of law, in particular Kant’s statements on subjective law, on the abandonment of the law and on the rule of law. The basic features of Kant’s theory of crime will be presented in the following nine theses, backed up by relevant textual evidence.

The Kantian System of Duties

Beginning with Kant’s infamous “derivation of duties” problem, the chapter argues that the Groundwork’s categorical imperative (as principle or test) was never intended for duty-generation. By contrast, the two parts of the Metaphysics of Morals set out a system of duties, with priority given to duties of Right. Answerable to innate right, juridical duties secure persons’ moral standing. The institutions of Right create new moral powers that enable persons to obligate others, resolving the moral impossibilities of human life in a state of nature. Examples of self-defense and duties of free communication show how a value that first appears as a juridical duty descends to and is completed by ethical duties, here concerning truthful speech and integrity of the body. The chapter concludes with an argument for the idea of “provisional universal right” that marks a moral standard and source of duties even where legitimate juridical conditions are absent.

“Metaphysics about Metaphysics.” Kant on Theoretical, Practical and Practico-Theoretical Metaphysics

The essay investigates the relation between metaphysics and practical philosophy in Kant by reconstructing Kant‘s systematic typology of metaphysics as developed in his critical writings. Section 1 deals with Kant’s rigorous reduction of philosophy to metaphysics. The focus here is on the epistemological turn effectuated by Kant with regard to metaphysics (theoretical metaphysics). Section 2 is concerned with Kant’s reconceptualization of (pure) practical philosophy as a metaphysics sui generis. At the center stands here Kant’s supplementation of the metaphysics of nature through a metaphysics of morals based on moral freedom (practical metaphysics). Section 3 addresses the merging of theoretical and practical metaphysics in Kant. The focus here lies on Kant’s introduction of a novel, practically validated form of (quasi-)theoretical metaphysics (practico-theoretical metaphysics). Throughout the essay combines an analytic interest in the forms and functions of metaphysics in Kant with a systematic interest in the practical and practico-theoretical transformation of previously theoretical metaphysics in Kant, which morphs from a doctrine of the objects of nature through a doctrine of the laws of freedom to a doctrine of wisdom regarding the supersensible.

Mental Faculties, the Moral Law, and Human Motivation

This chapter addresses the following topics pertaining to Section II of the general introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals: 1. Kant’s conception of the faculty of desire and its relation to the faculties of feeling and cognition; 2. The significance of Kant’s distinction between will and choice in relation to human freedom of the will; 3. The distinction between maxims and imperatives as two fundamental types of practical principle; and 4. Kant’s conception of both nonmoral and moral motivation—the latter fundamental for understanding Kant’s theory of virtue. The chapter establishes Kant’s background ideas on these ideas and faculties and also addresses aspects of his theory of action.

Life and Work

This chapter is an introduction to Kant’s life and his work. It situates Kant’s moral philosophy historically, explains his writing of The Doctrine of Virtue (DV) and its place in Kant’s overall moral philosophy. The chapter concludes with an overview of the book’s five parts. Part I is background comprising two chapters. Part II explains the material in Kant’s general introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals, of which DV is a part. Part III covers the dedicated introduction to DV, while parts IV and V cover the doctrine of elements of ethics and the doctrine of method that comprise his normative ethical theory.

The Doctrine of Virtue as a Doctrine of Ends

This chapter concerns the first three sections of Kant’s dedicated introduction to Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals—The Doctrine of Virtue. Section 1 of the chapter explains why, according to Kant, there must be a doctrine of virtue as a part of a more comprehensive doctrine of morals. Section 2 explains why ethics is both a doctrine of virtue and a doctrine of ends. Section 3 discusses the concept of an end that is also a duty and why such ends are fundamental in a doctrine of virtue. Section 4 considers Kant’s argument that there must be ends that are also duties, otherwise (so he argues) there can be no doctrine of morals. The chapter’s conclusion is summary.

On the Idea of and Necessity for a Metaphysics of Morals

This chapter focuses on Section I of the general introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals in which Kant explains what a metaphysics of morals is, and why there must be one. To properly understand Kant’s views on these matters requires explaining Kant’s conception of philosophy and the place of metaphysics as a branch of philosophy. In spelling this out, the chapter discusses key distinctions between theoretical and practical cognition, empirical (a posteriori) versus rational (a priori) sources of cognition, and the analytic/synthetic distinction as Kant understood it. For Kant, a metaphysics of morals is that branch of philosophy concerned with those synthetic a priori propositions and principles fundamental to morality. The chapter also explains the role of anthropology in a metaphysics of morals.

Moral Education and Practice

The second part of The Doctrine of Virtue is the doctrine of methods that concerns moral education and the practice of virtue. This chapter elaborates Kant’s conception of moral education including the so-called catechism method of moral instruction. The methods of practicing virtue Kant refers to as “ethical ascetics,” in which he stresses the importance of striving to be both “valiant and cheerful” in carrying out one’s duties. Following this is Kant’s conclusion to the book, in which he explains why a metaphysics of morals does not include reference to God or religion. The chapter concludes with reflections on the outstanding tasks for the methods including how the pure laws of morality can gain access to one’s mind and how they can also influence one’s decisions.