Humanitarian Intervention as a Duty

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kok-Chor Tan

Assuming an international commitment to intervene in severe and urgent humanitarian emergencies, as expressed by the doctrine ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, I discuss two objections that the duty to intervene is nonetheless a duty that is easily limited by other moral considerations. One objection is that this duty will exceed the reasonable limits of any obligation given the high personal cost of intervention. The other objection is that any duty to intervene will be an imperfect duty, and therefore not a duty that is ascribed to and demandable of any specific actor. I will argue that these objections do not undermine the principle of the responsibility to protect.

Author(s):  
Richard Caplan

States – Western ones, at least – have given increased weight to human rights and humanitarian norms as matters of international concern, with the authorization of legally binding enforcement measures to tackle humanitarian crises under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These concerns were also developed outside the UN Security Council framework, following Tony Blair’s Chicago speech and the contemporaneous NATO action over Kosovo. This gave rise to international commissions and resulted, among other things, in the emergence of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine. The adoption of this doctrine coincided with a period in which there appeared to be a general decline in mass atrocities. Yet R2P had little real effect – it cannot be shown to have caused the fall in mass atrocities, only to have echoed it. Thus, the promise of R2P and an age of humanitarianism failed to emerge, even if the way was paved for future development.


Author(s):  
Marco Meyer

This chapter argues that even non-abusive interventions (those that are motivated purely by altruistic concern, have a just cause, are a last resort etc.) are morally problematic due to their effects on the international order. The trouble is that ‘bystander states’—those that are neither prosecuting the intervention nor targeted by it—usually do not have sufficient direct evidence that the intervention is just and properly motivated, nor can they trust the testimony of the intervening state. Thus, for all that bystander states know, any and every instance of humanitarian intervention is abusive: an act of unjust international aggression masquerading as something else. This, in turn, weakens the willingness of these bystander states to comply with the non-aggression norm themselves, since states are ‘conditional cooperators’—they abide by norms only insofar as they are reasonably assured that other states in the international arena are abiding.


An enduring concern about armed humanitarian intervention, and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine that advocates its use under certain circumstances, is that such interventions are liable to be employed as a foreign policy instrument by powerful states pursuing geopolitical interests. This collection of essays critically investigates the causes and consequences, as well as the uses and abuses, of armed humanitarian intervention. Some of the chapters interrogate how the presence of ulterior motives impact on the moral credentials of armed humanitarian intervention. Others shine a light on the potential adverse effects of such interventions, even where they are motivated primarily by humanitarian concern. While some of these unwanted consequences will be familiar to readers, others have been largely neglected in the scholarship. The volume also tracks the evolution of the R2P norm, and draws attention to how it has evolved, for better or for worse, since UN member states unanimously accepted it over a decade ago. In some respects, the norm has been distorted to yield prescriptions, and to impose constraint, fundamentally at odds with the spirit of the R2P idea. This gives us all the more reason to be cautious of unwarranted optimism about humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect.


2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (S1) ◽  
pp. 25-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
WILLIAM BAIN

AbstractThis article takes up Louise Arbour's claim that the doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is grounded in existing obligations of international law, specifically those pertaining to the prevention and punishment of genocide. In doing so, it argues that the aspirations of the R2P project cannot be sustained by the idea of ‘responsibility’ alone. The article proceeds in arguing that the coherence of R2P depends on an unacknowledged and unarticulated theory of obligation that connects notions of culpability, blame, and accountability with the kind of preventive, punitive, and restorative action that Arbour and others advocate. Two theories of obligation are then offered, one natural the other conventional, which make this connection explicit. But the ensuing clarity comes at a cost: the naturalist account escapes the ‘real’ world to redeem the intrinsic dignity of all men and women, while the conventionalist account remains firmly tethered to the ‘real’ world in redeeming whatever dignity can be had by way of an agreement. The article concludes by arguing that the advocate of the responsibility to protect can have one or the other, but not both.


2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 134-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabine Hassler

This article examines the debate surrounding the responsibility to protect [R2P] with particular reference to the use of peacekeeping forces in that regard. Post-Cold War, human protection had expanded into a matter of international concern. Yet, where formerly humanitarian intervention was the mot du jour, a change in conceptual vocabulary led to the introduction of R2P and to a redefinition of sovereignty. Accordingly, the primary responsibility to protect its citizens rests with the sovereign state but, owing to international solidarity, the residual responsibility rests with the international community. Contextually, R2P is embedded in a continuum of responsibilities: prevent, react and rebuild. Proponents of the concept already see a norm in development. Still, divisions and confusion remain concerning the concept’s legal basis, its scope and its parameters. This is particularly relevant in view of peacekeeping forces, which have been increasingly deployed for humanitarian purposes. Because of ill-defined mandates and an overextension of resources, however, traditional peacekeeping is no longer suitable, lacking the resources, the personnel and the necessary expertise. To be able to fulfil the goals of R2P, peacekeeping will have to be redefined and the forces equipped with more robust mandates or fail.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 390-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Ferris

The emergence of the Responsibility to Protect (r2p) doctrine is part of a universal longing to prevent atrocities and to protect those affected by them. While its origins are quite distinct from international humanitarian principles, its links with humanitarian issues are clear. In fact, r2p emerged in response to humanitarian tragedies. This article traces the intersection of r2p and protection frameworks for refugees and internally displaced persons (idps), recognizing the important differences between them. r2p focuses on prevention, response and rebuilding – the first two tasks of which are inherently political. Conflicts cannot be prevented or resolved without engaging in political action of one kind or another. Responding to atrocities requires taking sides. Normative frameworks on refugees and idps, on the other hand, are based on the principle that people are to be assisted and protected on the basis of need alone and that humanitarian action is non-political in nature.


Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy ◽  
Nicholas J. Wheeler

This chapter examines the role of humanitarian intervention in world politics. It considers how we should resolve tensions when valued principles such as order, sovereignty, and self-determination come into conflict with human rights; and how international thought and practice has evolved with respect to humanitarian intervention. The chapter discusses the case for and against humanitarian intervention and looks at humanitarian activism during the 1990s. It also analyses the responsibility to protect principle and the use of force to achieve its protection goals in Libya in 2011. Two case studies are presented, one dealing with humanitarian intervention in Darfur and the other with the role of Middle Eastern governments in Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011. There is also an Opposing Opinions box that asks whether the West should intervene in Syria to protect people there from the Islamic State (ISIS).


2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 897-919 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garrett Wallace Brown ◽  
Alexandra Bohm

Cosmopolitans often argue that the international community has a humanitarian responsibility to intervene militarily in order to protect vulnerable individuals from violent threats and to pursue the establishment of a condition of cosmopolitan justice based on the notion of a ‘global rule of law’. The purpose of this article is to argue that many of these cosmopolitan claims are incomplete and untenable on cosmopolitan grounds because they ignore the systemic and chronic structural factors that underwrite the root causes of these humanitarian threats. By way of examining cosmopolitan arguments for humanitarian military intervention and how systemic problems are further ignored in iterations of the Responsibility to Protect, this article suggests that many contemporary cosmopolitan arguments are guilty of focusing too narrowly on justifying a responsibility to respond to the symptoms of crisis versus demanding a similarly robust justification for a responsibility to alleviate persistent structural causes. Although this article recognizes that immediate principles of humanitarian intervention will, at times, be necessary, the article seeks to draw attention to what we are calling principles of Jus ante Bellum (right before war) and to stress that current cosmopolitan arguments about humanitarian intervention will remain insufficient without the incorporation of robust principles of distributive global justice that can provide secure foundations for a more thoroughgoing cosmopolitan condition of public right.


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