Algebraic Methods in Side-Channel Collision Attacks and Practical Collision Detection

Side-channel collision attacks are more powerful than traditional side-channel attack without knowing the leakage model or establishing the model. Most attack strategies proposed previously need quantities of power traces with high computational complexity and are sensitive to mistakes, which restricts the attack efficiency seriously. In this paper, we propose a multiple-bits side-channel collision attack based on double distance voting detection (DDVD) and also an improved version, involving the error-tolerant mechanism, which can find all 120 relations among 16 key bytes when applied to AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithm. In addition, we compare our collision detection method called DDVD with the Euclidean distance and the correlation-enhanced collision method under different intensity of noise, which indicates that our detection technique performs better in the circumstances of noise. Furthermore, 4-bit model of our collision detection method is proven to be optimal in theory and in practice. Meanwhile the corresponding practical attack experiments are also performed on a hardware implementation of AES-128 on FPGA board successfully. Results show that our strategy needs less computation time but more traces than LDPC method and the online time for our strategy is about 90% less than CECA and 96% less than BCA with 90% success rate.

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Statistical Tools Flavor Side-Channel Collision Attacks

Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2012 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science ◽

10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_26 ◽

2012 ◽

pp. 428-445 ◽

Cited By ~ 39

Author(s):

Amir Moradi

Keyword(s):

Side Channel ◽

Statistical Tools ◽

Collision Attacks

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Improved Side-Channel Collision Attacks on AES

Selected Areas in Cryptography - Lecture Notes in Computer Science ◽

10.1007/978-3-540-77360-3_6 ◽

2007 ◽

pp. 84-95 ◽

Cited By ~ 46

Author(s):

Andrey Bogdanov

Keyword(s):

Side Channel ◽

Collision Attacks

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Multiple-Differential Side-Channel Collision Attacks on AES

Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2008 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science ◽

10.1007/978-3-540-85053-3_3 ◽

2008 ◽

pp. 30-44 ◽

Cited By ~ 42

Author(s):

Andrey Bogdanov

Keyword(s):

Side Channel ◽

Collision Attacks

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Two Improved Multiple-Differential Collision Attacks

Mathematical Problems in Engineering ◽

10.1155/2014/209692 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 2014 ◽

pp. 1-11

Author(s):

An Wang ◽

Liji Wu ◽

Zongyue Wang ◽

Xuexin Zheng ◽

Man Chen ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Collision Detection ◽

Power Analysis ◽

High Noise ◽

Power Analysis Attacks ◽

Success Ratio ◽

Sampling Points ◽

Collision Attacks

In CHES 2008, Bogdanov proposed multiple-differential collision attacks which could be applied to the power analysis attacks on practical cryptographic systems. However, due to the effect of countermeasures on FPGA, there are some difficulties during the collision detection, such as local high noise and the lack of sampling points. In this paper, keypoints voting test is proposed for solving these problems, which can increase the success ratio from 35% to 95% on the example of one implementation. Furthermore, we improve the ternary voting test of Bogdanov, which can improve the experiment efficiency markedly. Our experiments show that the number of power traces required in our attack is only a quarter of the requirement of traditional attack. Finally, some alternative countermeasures against our attacks are discussed.

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