Some New Domain Restrictions in Social Choice, and Their Consequences

Author(s):  
Salvador Barberà ◽  
Dolors Berga ◽  
Bernardo Moreno
2007 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberà

AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to discuss the extent to which allowing for individuals to be indifferent among alternatives may alter the qualitative results that are obtained in social choice theory when domain restrictions are defined on profiles of linear orders. The general message is that indifferences require attention and careful treatment, because the translation of results from a world without indifferences to another where agents may be indifferent among some alternatives is not always a straightforward exercise. But the warning is not one-directional: sometimes indifferences complicate the statement of results, but preserve their essential message. Sometimes, they help to create domains where some rules work better than in the presence of linear orders. In other cases, however, their presence destroys the positive results that would apply in their absence. I provide examples of these three situations.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Doghmi

AbstractIn this paper we give a full characterization of Nash implementability of social choice correspondences (SCCs) in allotment economies on preference domains with private values and different types of indifference. We focus on single-peaked/single-plateaued preferences with worst indifferent allocations, single-troughed preferences and single-troughed preferences with best indifferent allocations. We begin by introducing a weak variant of no-veto power, called


2000 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 518-522
Author(s):  
Mohammed H. I. Dore
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Vladimir I. Danilov ◽  
Alexander I. Sotskov
Keyword(s):  

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