Differential Games and Environmental Economics

We consider n-person pure bargaining games in which the space of feasible payoffs is constructed via a normal form differential game. At the beginning of the game the agents bargain over strategies to be played over an infinite time horizon. An initial cooperative solution (a strategy tuple) is called subgame individually rational (SIR) if it remains individually rational throughout the entire game and time consistent (TC) if renegotiating it at a later time instant yields the original solution. For a class of linear-state differential games we show that any solution which is individually rational at the beginning of the game satisfies SIR and TC if the space of admissible cooperative strategies is restricted to constants. We discuss an application from environmental economics.

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Differential games in resources and environmental economics

Differential Games in Economics and Management Science ◽

10.1017/cbo9780511805127.013 ◽

2000 ◽

pp. 315-343

Keyword(s):

Differential Games ◽

Environmental Economics

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The solution to pollution? The value and limitations of environmental economics in guiding aquaculture development

Aquaculture Economics & Management ◽

10.1046/j.1365-7313.1999.00032.x ◽

1999 ◽

Vol 3 (1) ◽

pp. 43 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

JAMES F. Muir

Keyword(s):

Environmental Economics ◽

Aquaculture Development

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Economic models of Environment monitoring under imperfect information and high Costs

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2014-4-99-122 ◽

2014 ◽

pp. 99-122

Author(s):

M. Levin ◽

K. Matrosova

Keyword(s):

Environmental Monitoring ◽

Environmental Regulation ◽

Environmental Economics ◽

Imperfect Information ◽

Central Element ◽

Economic Models ◽

Environment Monitoring ◽

Nature Protection ◽

Protection Measures ◽

Effective System

The paper considers monitoring of environmental change as the central element of environmental regulation. Monitoring, as each kind of principalagent relations, easily gives rise to corruptive behavior. In the paper we analyze economic models of environmental monitoring with high costs, incomplete information and corruption. These models should be the elements of environmental economics and are needed to create an effective system of nature protection measures.

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