Original or Fake — A Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information

1991 ◽  
pp. 186-229
Author(s):  
Reinhard Selten ◽  
Werner Güth
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Bargaining Game

scholarly journals More dangerous than dyads: how a third party enables rationalist explanations for war

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Gallop
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dyadic Analysis ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Commitment Problems ◽  
Bargaining Model Of War ◽  
State Preferences

For the bargaining model of war, in the absence of incomplete information and commitment problems, war is irrational. But this finding rests on a simple and rarely discussed assumption, that bargaining is between exactly two participants. When we relax this assumption, in a three-player bargaining game, war is an equilibrium. Thus, a key finding of the bargaining model, that there is always an agreement that all states prefer war, is an artifact of dyadic analysis. By removing this limitation, we can find new factors that affect the risk of war: the number of actors, divergence in state preferences, alliance dynamics, and the issue being bargained over.

Revealing Preferences: Empirical Estimation of a Crisis Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information

2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 345-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey B. Lewis ◽  
Kenneth A. Schultz
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
American Political Science Review ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Strategic Game ◽  
Empirical Estimation ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Symmetric Information ◽  
American Political Science

We develop an empirical estimator directly from an extensive-form crisis bargaining game with incomplete information and discuss its features and limitations. The estimator makes it possible to draw inferences about states' payoffs from observational data on crisis outcomes while remaining faithful to the theorized strategic and informational structure. We compare this estimator to one based on a symmetric information version of the same game, using the quantal response equilibrium proposed in this context by Signorino (1999, American Political Science Review 93:279–298). We then address issues of identification that arise in trying to learn about actors' utilities by observing their play of a strategic game. In general, a number of identifying restrictions are needed in order to pin down the distribution of payoffs and the effects of covariates on those payoffs.

Averaging of temporal memories under conditions of incomplete information

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Leman ◽  
Matthew S. Matell ◽  
Michael Brown
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information
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