Instrumental or intrinsic? Human rights alignment in intergovernmental organizations

Why do states’ human rights records converge with co-members in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)? This study provides new insights on whether interactions in IGOs have the capacity to genuinely transform state preferences or whether norm diffusion is a consequence of instrumental processes. We leverage information about the timing of human rights alignment to disentangle intrinsic from instrumental motives. We hypothesize that instrumental motives find expression in pre-membership alignment and reversions to original normative standards after IGO exits. Intrinsic motives lead to gradual alignment during IGO membership and result in stable normative changes beyond IGO exits. Using varying-slopes, varying intercepts models, we investigate the distance on human rights indices between individual states and IGO means. While we find evidence for systematic convergence during IGO membership, no significant changes occur before and after IGO membership. Testing alignment of different physical integrity rights, we find no evidence for instrumental shifts to clandestine repression during IGO membership. Overall, the results suggest that norm alignment in IGOs is at least not exclusively instrumentally motivated. Our findings support constructivist arguments on state interests and suggest that IGOs are capable of transforming states’ human rights related preferences.

Covert balancing: Great Powers, secondary states and US balancing strategies against China

Throughout history, Great Powers have devised balancing strategies aimed at checking the ambitions of rival Great Powers. To do that, they have sought to enter and mobilize alliances and security partnerships with secondary states. Yet, the influence of secondary states on the balancing strategies of Great Powers remains largely underestimated in the International Relations literature. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we posit that secondary state preferences play a key enabling or constraining role in shaping the balancing choices of Great Powers. We focus specifically on how the adoption of hedging strategies on the part of secondary states affects the balancing strategies of established Great Powers. We argue that when secondary states adopt a hedging strategy established Great Powers are incentivized to engage in what we call ‘covert balancing’. Covert balancing occurs when an established Great Power conceals its security cooperation with a secondary state beneath a cover that is seemingly unrelated to balancing a rising Great Power, thus working around the secondary state's hedging strategy while at the same time helping generate a latent capacity to balance. We probe our argument by examining US balancing strategy against China in the Asia–Pacific.

A network approach to measuring state preferences

State preferences play an important role in international politics. Unfortunately, actually observing and measuring these preferences are impossible. In general, scholars have tried to infer preferences using either UN voting or alliance behavior. The two most notable measures of state preferences that have flowed from this research area are ideal points (Bailey et al., 2017) and S-scores (Signorino & Ritter, 1999). The basis of both these models is a spatial weighting scheme that has proven useful but discounts higher-order effects that might be present in relational data structures such as UN voting and alliances. We begin by arguing that both alliances and UN voting are simply examples of the multiple layers upon which states interact with one another. To estimate a measure of state preferences, we utilize a tensor decomposition model that provides a reduced-rank approximation of the main patterns across the layers. Our new measure of preferences plausibly describes important state relations and yields important insights on the relationship between preferences, democracy, and international conflict. Additionally, we show that a model of conflict using this measure of state preferences decisively outperforms models using extant measures when it comes to predicting conflict in an out-of-sample context.

Modulation of Mn3+ Spin State by Guest Molecule Inclusion

Spin state preferences for a cationic Mn3+ chelate complex in four different crystal lattices are investigated by crystallography and SQUID magnetometry. The [MnL1]+ complex cation was prepared by complexation of Mn3+ to the Schiff base chelate formed from condensation of 4-methoxysalicylaldehyde and 1,2-bis(3-aminopropylamino)ethane. The cation was crystallized separately with three polyatomic counterions and in one case was found to cocrystallize with a percentage of unreacted 4-methoxysalicylaldehyde starting material. The spin state preferences of the four resultant complexes [MnL1]CF3SO3·xH2O, (1), [MnL1]PF6·xH2O, (2), [MnL1]PF6·xsal·xH2O, (2b), and [MnL1]BPh4, (3), were dependent on their ability to form strong intermolecular interactions. Complexes (1) and (2), which formed hydrogen bonds between [MnL1]+, lattice water and in one case also with counterion, showed an incomplete thermal spin crossover over the temperature range 5–300 K. In contrast, complex (3) with the BPh4−, counterion and no lattice water, was locked into the high spin state over the same temperature range, as was complex (2b), where inclusion of the 4-methoxysalicylaldehyde guest blocked the H-bonding interaction.

Reforming International Organizations

Recent scholarship has highlighted the role of domestic pressures in determining state preferences toward the reform of international organizations (IO s). This article adds a new dimension by examining how partisanship and ministerial control affect state preferences toward IO empowerment. The article derives two expectations from the existing literature. First, partisan position will determine preferences toward IO empowerment. Second, when a government is constituted by multiple parties, the position of the party with the IO’s ministerial portfolio will determine the government’s position toward IO empowerment. The article illustrates this argument by examining the positions of four net donors (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and two net recipients (Brazil and India) during the World Bank’s reforms. By bringing domestic politics back in, this article complements existing studies on the politics of IO reform and weighs in on central debates in comparative politics and international political economy.

A Theory of State Preferences and Resource Competition

Chapter 2 develops a theory of states’ foreign policy preferences. A state’s preference for territory depends on its economic structure and domestic political institutions. Economic structure determines the state’s source of income. Production-oriented states whose economies are structured to generate income from producing goods will be less interested in resources and territory. In contrast, land-oriented states that are economically dependent on resource rents will have a stronger preference to seek control over resource-rich territory. This effect holds in both autocracies and democracies. However, autocracies should place a greater value on the political benefits associated with land rents because they are a source of wealth that is easier to control and extract. In sum, the more autocratic and land-oriented the state, the stronger its preference for resource rents and the more the state should invest in projecting military force to secure resources.