Incomplete Information: Structure, Inference, Complexity

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stéphane P. Demri ◽  
Ewa S. Orłowska
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Information Structure

scholarly journals Information Design: A Unified Perspective

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Bergemann ◽  
Stephen Morris
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Design Problem ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Large Body ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Literal Interpretation ◽  
Uncertain Payoffs ◽  
Metaphorical Interpretation

Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures. We provide an introduction to the basic issues and insights of a rapidly growing literature in information design. We show how the literal and metaphorical interpretations of information design unify a large body of existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson 1991), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011), and some of our own recent work on robust predictions in games of incomplete information. ( JEL C70, D82, D83)

scholarly journals Learning by matching

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi-Chun Chen ◽  
Gaoji Hu
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Specific Information ◽  
Job Market ◽  
Alternative Learning ◽  
Learning Patterns ◽  
Information Updating ◽  
The Status

This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the workers' side. Each worker is associated with a type, and each firm cares about the type of her employee under a match. Moreover, firms' information structure is described by partitions over possible worker type profiles. With this firm‐specific information, we propose a stability notion which, in addition to requiring individual rationality and no blocking pairs, captures the idea that the absence of rematching conveys no further information. When an allocation is not stable under the status quo information structure, a new pair of an allocation and an information structure will be derived. We show that starting from an arbitrary allocation and an arbitrary information structure, the process of allowing randomly chosen blocking pairs to rematch, accompanied by information updating, will converge with probability one to an allocation that is stable under the updated information structure. Our results are robust with respect to various alternative learning patterns.

scholarly journals Sequential Information Design

Econometrica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (6) ◽  
pp. 2575-2608
Author(s):  
Laura Doval ◽  
Jeffrey C. Ely
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Main Concept ◽  
Sequential Information

We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff‐relevant data but not the players' private information, nor the extensive form that governs their play. Alternatively, a designer may be able to build a mechanism from these ingredients. We characterize all outcomes that can arise in an equilibrium of some extensive form with some information structure. We show how to specialize our main concept to capture the additional restrictions implied by extensive‐form refinements.

scholarly journals Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (5) ◽  
pp. 586-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Bergemann ◽  
Stephen Morris
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium

A set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. We consider the problem of an “information designer” who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). We describe a unifying perspective for information design. We consider a simple example of Bayesian persuasion with both an uninformed and informed receiver. We extend information design to many player and relate it to the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium.

Averaging of temporal memories under conditions of incomplete information

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Leman ◽  
Matthew S. Matell ◽  
Michael Brown
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information

A Political Economy Model of a Research University

2009 ◽  
pp. 132-143
Author(s):  
K. Sonin ◽  
I. Khovanskaya
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Structure ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Research University ◽  
Hiring Decisions ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Economy Model ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
Optimal Incentives

Hiring decisions are typically made by committees members of which have different capacity to estimate the quality of candidates. Organizational structure and voting rules in the committees determine the incentives and strategies of applicants; thus, construction of a modern university requires a political structure that provides committee members and applicants with optimal incentives. The existing political-economic model of informative voting typically lacks any degree of variance in the organizational structure, while political-economic models of organization typically assume a parsimonious information structure. In this paper, we propose a simple framework to analyze trade-offs in optimal subdivision of universities into departments and subdepartments, and allocation of political power.

On the Information Structure of the Hungarian Sentence

2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferenc Kiefer
Keyword(s):  
Information Structure
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