A Noncooperative Approach to the Nash Bargaining Problem

1991 ◽  
pp. 7-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Akira Okada
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Nash Bargaining Problem

A New Approach to the Nash Bargaining Problem

Econometrica ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 1163 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. L. Brito ◽  
A. M. Buoncristiani ◽  
M. D. Intriligator
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Nash Bargaining Problem

LEARNING BARGAINING CONVENTIONS

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 237-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Vanderschraaf
Keyword(s):  
Focal Point ◽  
Inductive Learning ◽  
Fair Division ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Division Problems ◽  
Egalitarian Solution ◽  
Bargaining Problems ◽  
Nash Bargaining Problem ◽  
Interpersonal Utility Comparisons

Abstract:I examine from a conventionalist perspective the Nash bargaining problem that philosophers use as a tool for analyzing fair division. From this perspective, the solutions to bargaining problems are conventions that can emerge from inductive learning and focal point effects. I contrast the conventionalist approach to analyzing the bargaining problem with the better-known rational choice approach, which I criticize for having overly demanding epistemic presuppositions and for producing disappointing results. I apply a simple model of inductive learning to specific bargaining problems to show that agents can learn from repeated experience to follow a variety of bargaining conventions in a given problem. I conclude that such agents can come to regard two such conventions as focal for the bargaining problem, one that assigns claimants equal shares of a good and another egalitarian solution of equal payoff gains, and that the egalitarian solution tends to prevail when these two solutions differ. I conclude further that the above analysis lends support for admitting interpersonal utility comparisons into the analysis of fair division problems, and also suggests a focal point explanation of the wide acceptance of the Aristotelian proportionality principle of distributive justice.

Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty

2014 ◽  
Vol 115 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-274
Author(s):  
Sanxi Li ◽  
Hailin Sun ◽  
Jianye Yan ◽  
Xundong Yin
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Nash Bargaining Problem

Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points

Econometrica ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 961 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zvi Safra ◽  
Lin Zhou ◽  
Itzhak Zilcha
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Nash Bargaining Problem

scholarly journals Can Game Theory Help to Mitigate Water Conflicts in the Syrdarya Basin?

2017 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 1393-1401
Author(s):  
Lea Melnikovová
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Water Allocation ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Simplified Model ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Optimal Outcome ◽  
Current Case ◽  
Subject Field ◽  
Nash Bargaining Problem

This paper focuses on methods to resolve the ongoing conflict between countries in the Syrdarya Basin, namely Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, over water allocation. It addresses the problem by using the cooperative games framework. It identifies difficulties of choosing the most suitable solution to the Nash bargaining problem under the current circumstances and also reveals complications that may obstruct negotiations on water allocation. The latter is done by using a simplified model from a different subject field which explains why the negotiations have sequential character. The Kalai‑Smorodinsky solution is recommended as optimal in the concrete situation because it takes into account efficiency of water use of the involved parties and its sequential use leads to a Pareto‑optimal outcome. Also a compromise between the Kalai‑Smorodinsky and dictator solutions can be considered for the current case.

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